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PATENT LAW’S FUNCTIONALITY 
MALFUNCTION AND THE PROBLEM  
OF OVERBROAD, FUNCTIONAL  
SOFTWARE PATENTS 
KEVIN EMERSON COLLINS
 
ABSTRACT 
Contemporary software patents are problematic because they are often 
overbroad. This Article offers a novel explanation of the root cause of this 
overbreadth. Patent law suffers from a functionality malfunction: the 
conventional scope-curtailing doctrines of patent law break down and lose 
their ability to rein in overbroad claims whenever they are brought to bear 
on technologies, like software, in which inventions are purely functional 
entities.  
In addition to identifying the functionality malfunction in the software 
arts, this Article evaluates the merits of the most promising way of fixing 
it. Courts can identify algorithms as the metaphorical structure of 
software inventions and limit claim scope to particular algorithms for 
achieving a claimed function. However, framing algorithms as the 
metaphorical structure of software inventions cannot put the scope of 
software patents on par with the scope of patents in other arts. Most 
importantly, the recursive nature of algorithms and Gottschalk v. Benson 
create to-date unappreciated problems. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Software patents are overbroad. Compared to patents in other fields of 
endeavor, they routinely grant inventors rights that extend further beyond 
the technology that an inventor has actually invented and disclosed.
1
 The 
 
 
 1. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, 
AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 199 (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE 
PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 159–60 (2009); Mark A. Lemley, Software 
Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming 2–4 (Stanford Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 2117302, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117302; Brian J. Love, Why Patentable Subject Matters 
for Software, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 1 (2012); Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property 
Protection for Cumulative Systems Technology, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2674 (1994). Overbreadth is not 
the only problematic aspect of software patents. See Lemley, supra, at 24–31 (surveying arguments 
that identify problematic aspects of software patents). Some empirical evidence suggests that software 
patents are not unusually likely to be ―bad‖ patents that the PTO should not have issued. Stuart J.H. 
Graham & Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Of Smart Phone Wars and Software Patents, 27 J. ECON. 
PERSPECT. 67 (2013); David J. Kappos, Investing in America’s Future Through Innovation: How the 
Debate over the Smart Phone Patent Wars (Re)Raises Issues at the Foundation of Long-Term 
Incentive Systems, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 485 (2013). However, this evidence is irrelevant to the 
issue of overbreadth if, as this Article argues, software patents are overbroad because the patent 
doctrine that invalidates overbroad patents in most arts is ineffective in the software arts. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/4
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blame for the problem of software-patent overbreadth has at times been 
placed squarely on the shoulders of the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit. The Federal Circuit has dropped the ball, so the argument goes, in 
that it has failed to employ patent law‘s well-developed tools for curtailing 
permissible patent scope in the software arts.
2
 Given this explanation of 
the problem, the solution seems self-evident and eminently achievable: the 
Federal Circuit must simply step up and use the tools that are already at its 
disposal to curb the scope of software patents.  
This Article offers a different explanation for the overbreadth of 
contemporary software patents. The root of the problem is not that the 
Federal Circuit has failed to deploy in the software arts the well-developed 
doctrinal tools for curtailing patent scope that it already uses in other arts. 
To the contrary, the most important of these tools is not effective in the 
software arts. Software is intrinsically different from most other patentable 
subject matters in a way that matters. It lacks the metaphorical bolt onto 
which patent law‘s primary scope-restricting doctrinal tool can attach to 
gain purchase and ratchet in permissible claim scope. By demonstrating 
that the problem of software-patent overbreadth goes deeper than has 
previously been recognized, this Article does more than identify a new 
cause of a known problem. It also counsels greater skepticism toward the 
existence of a simple, judicially administered solution to the problem. The 
problems that plague software-patent scope cannot be remedied as easily 
as many suggest they can be, and the anomalously high costs of 
contemporary software patents are unlikely to ever be eliminated. 
To explain why patent law‘s conventional scope-curtailing doctrines 
are ineffective in the software arts, this Article articulates and defends two 
premises. First, it identifies the principal mechanism through which patent 
doctrine allows judges and examiners to successfully curtail permissible 
claim scope in technological arts other than the software arts. There is a 
distinction between the structure and function of an invention—that is, a 
distinction between the physical form of an invention and the behaviors 
that an invention can exhibit, respectively. Building on this distinction, 
patent doctrine makes what this Article calls the invention-structure 
equation: it holds as an ontological matter that an invention ―is‖ its 
 
 
 2. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1204–05 (2002) (arguing that the Federal Circuit could rectify the 
problem of overbroad software claims by tweaking the enablement analysis); Lemley, supra note 1, at 
4, 38–42 (arguing that courts can fix the problem of software overbreadth ―in one fell swoop‖ by 
restricting functional software claims to algorithms for performing the claimed function under section 
112(f)).  
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structure and that an invention‘s function is more peripherally only what 
an invention ―does.‖3 The invention-structure equation, in turn, gives rise 
to an effective tool for curtailing permissible claim scope. Patents that 
recite enough of the physical, structural properties of what an inventor has 
invented as claim limitations are valid because they are limited in scope to 
an inventor‘s invention. However, the flip side of the invention-structure 
equation is that functional claims—that is, claims that only recite the 
behaviors of an invention as limitations—are not valid. Construed literally, 
functional claims encompass all structures that are capable of performing 
the claimed behaviors, meaning that they reach beyond the structures 
conceived and disclosed by an inventor and thus beyond an inventor‘s 
invention. In sum, the invention-structure equation is a doctrinal tool that 
courts use to invalidate broad, functional claims and rein in permissible 
claim scope in most arts.  
The second premise addresses the intrinsic nature of software as a 
technology: software inventions are pure functionality. Software is a 
powerful technology precisely because it has been engineered at a deep 
level to ensure that the specification of functional properties does not 
require the specification of any physical, structural properties. Software 
inventions therefore cannot be defined with reference to the physical, 
structural properties of either a tangible copy of the software on a storage 
medium or a computer programmed with the software. They can only be 
defined by their behavior or function. They are functional entities ―all the 
way down‖ on all relevant levels of description.4 It makes no sense to talk 
about the physical, structural properties of a software invention when 
identifying what a software inventor has invented.
5
  
The juxtaposition of these two premises—namely, the invention-
structure equation in patent law and the intrinsically functional nature of 
software as a technology—lays bare the root cause of the contemporary 
problem of software-patent overbreadth. Permissible claim scope is 
usually tethered to the structure of an invention, but purely functional 
 
 
 3. In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  
 4. STEPHEN HAWKING, A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 1 (updated & expanded 10th anniversary ed. 
1998) (using an origin myth about a stack of turtles to raise the issue of infinite regress to find a 
ground for an argument).  
 5. Of course, every embodiment of a software program is a material entity. A software 
invention is functional all the way down in the sense that the properties that make a software program 
a material entity—that is, its physical, structural properties—are not relevant to the definition of a 
protectable software invention or the scope of the patent that a software inventor should obtain as an 
economic matter. It is only in this limited sense that software inventions are pure functionality: 
software is clearly a material entity, but the invention-structure equation cannot use its materiality as a 
post to which to tether permissible patent scope.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/4
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technologies like software have no relevant structure to which claim scope 
can be tethered. The only way to fashion a viable claim to a software 
invention is to employ purely functional claim language, so the prohibition 
on functional claims that reins in claim breadth in other arts cannot be 
used to rein in claim breadth in the software arts, at least without 
eliminating effective patent protection for software altogether. This 
doctrinal failure is what this Article calls patent law‘s functionality 
malfunction: the invention-structure equation is ineffective whenever it is 
brought to bear on inventions, such as software, that are pure functionality. 
The invention-structure equation suggests that the three most important 
concepts to keep in mind when understanding how patent doctrine usually 
curtails patent overbreadth are ―structure, structure, structure.‖ In contrast, 
the three most important concepts to keep in mind to understand the nature 
of a software invention are ―function, function, function.‖ It is this 
mismatch that gives rise to the functionality malfunction and that leads to 
overbroad claims in the software arts. 
Tracing the problem of software-patent overbreadth to the functionality 
malfunction is important in two ways. First, it breaks new ground by 
demonstrating that most of the conceptual heavy lifting required to 
identify the cause of software-patent overbreadth cannot be accomplished 
through greater scrutiny of software patents in isolation. Instead, what is 
needed is a better understanding of how patent law regulates permissible 
claim scope as a general matter in other arts. Conventional wisdom 
identifies enablement as the most effective tool for reining in overbroad 
patents.
6
 This Article upends this conventional wisdom, arguing that the 
invention-structure equation is the most effective tool, at least when the 
source of the overbreadth is functional claim language.
7
 In part, this 
inversion follows from understanding the shortcomings of the enablement 
doctrine as a means of curtailing the type of overbreadth created by 
functional claims.
8
 In larger part, however, it follows from recognizing 
just how pervasive and fundamental the invention-structure equation is in 
contemporary patent law. The invention-structure equation undergirds at 
least three patent doctrines: the exclusion of claims to ―principles‖ or 
―abstract ideas‖ from patentable subject matter under section 101,9 the 
 
 
 6. See infra note 144.  
 7. Interestingly, although functional claiming is widely viewed as leading to overbroad patents, 
why functional claims are overbroad has not to date been explored. This Article therefore offers a first 
sketch of this analysis, which turns out to be more complex than one might initially expect. See infra 
Part II.B. 
 8. See infra Part II.D. 
 9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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section 112(f) rules of means-plus-function claiming,
10
 and the section 
112(a) written description requirement.
11
 These three doctrines are usually 
addressed within isolated analytical silos, perhaps because each has its 
own distinct linguistic formulation and statutory grounding. This 
compartmentalization has masked the importance of the invention-
structure equation, allowing one of the fundamental design principles of 
patent law‘s regulation of permissible claim scope to pass below the radar 
of patent courts and commentators. (It is for this reason that this Article 
has to coin the name ―invention-structure equation.‖) To understand what 
is wrong with the scope of software patents, it is initially necessary to 
reveal the hidden design principle that curtails permissible claim scope in 
other arts. Only then can the import of the principle‘s inefficacy in the 
software arts be fully appreciated. The peculiarities of the figure (patent 
protection in the software arts) come into clear focus only by focusing 
initially on the ground (patent protection in other arts). 
Second, the functionality malfunction offers support for a new 
software-exceptionalist approach to patent protection. Arguments 
supporting exceptional treatment of software in the patent regime often 
rely on the economics of innovation in the software industry or 
examination difficulties at the PTO to demonstrate how software is 
different.
12
 In contrast, the functionality malfunction suggests that it is the 
intrinsic, technical nature of software that makes software exceptional. 
The proliferation of overbroad claims in the software arts has not occurred 
because the Federal Circuit failed to port well-developed patent doctrine 
over to the software arts in an intelligent manner. The problem is rather 
that software is intrinsically different in a way that renders the well-
developed doctrine ineffective.
13
 
Of course, the functionality malfunction need not in and of itself doom 
software patents to a fate of anomalous overbreadth. A sui generis, 
software-specific solution could, in theory, bring the scope of software 
patents into line with the scope of patents in other technological arts. To 
 
 
 10. Id. § 112(f). 
 11. Id. § 112(a). 
 12. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 156–58; Glynn Lunney, E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363 (2001).  
 13. It is possible that inventions in some other technologies in which patents are viewed as 
problematic—such as business methods, printed texts, mental processes, and perhaps even monoclonal 
antibodies—are also functional all the way down, or at least close thereto. If this is true, then the 
functionality malfunction also explains, in part at least, why patents in these areas are problematic. To 
offer a proof of the principle, this Article only addresses the functionality malfunction in the software 
arts.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/4
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borrow a term from the software arts, the functionality malfunction 
demonstrates that patent law needs to be updated with a software-specific 
―patch.‖ Perhaps the most promising of such patches is to treat algorithms 
as the metaphorical structure of software inventions. In computer science, 
an algorithm specifies a step-by-step procedure that must be followed to 
perform any given functionally defined task.
14
 Algorithms are still 
functional entities in that they, too, are composed of functionally defined 
steps. Yet, because algorithms describe a specific set of functions for 
achieving the general function recited as a claim limitation, courts can 
frame them as the metaphorical structure of a software invention. That is, 
courts can adopt an invention-algorithm equation in the software arts: they 
can root a protectable invention in the algorithms that an inventor actually 
employs to achieve a claimed function, and they can limit the scope of 
functional software claims to particular algorithms for achieving the 
claimed functions. 
The idea of using algorithms to limit patent scope in the software arts is 
not new in either patent opinions or patent scholarship. The turn in the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to algorithms to limit the scope of 
software claims has already been noted in cases involving means-plus-
function limitations.
15
 However, the full extent of the Federal Circuit‘s 
turn to algorithms has not to date been appreciated. The Federal Circuit 
has taken the first, tentative steps toward adopting an invention-algorithm 
equation not only in means-plus-function software cases but also in 
software cases addressing the patentable subject matter and written 
description doctrines.
16
 Just as the unified nature of the invention-structure 
equation as a mechanism for curtailing permissible claim scope has 
remained hidden, the Federal Circuit‘s turn to algorithms in all three of the 
doctrines that employ the invention-algorithm equation in software cases 
has also gone unnoticed. 
Yet, despite the Federal Circuit‘s recent, tentative embrace of 
algorithms, this Article argues that the invention-algorithm equation is far 
from a panacea for patent law‘s functionality malfunction in the software 
arts. In fact, the medicine (courts curtailing claim scope to an algorithm for 
achieving a functionally specified claim limitation) may turn out to be 
more harmful than the disease (routinely overbroad, functional software 
 
 
 14. See infra notes 212–15 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Stephen Winslow, Means for Improving Modern Functional Patent Claiming, 98 
GEO. L.J. 1891 (2010); Sebastian Zimmeck, Use of Functional Claim Elements for Patenting 
Computer Programs, 12 J. HIGH TECH. L. 168 (2011); see also Lemley, supra note 1, at 38–43. 
 16. See infra Part IV.B. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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claims). Most important, algorithms are infinitely recursive. An algorithm 
specifies a step-by-step procedure for achieving a functional goal, but each 
of the steps of the algorithm is in turn nothing more than a functionally 
specified goal. Once an algorithm has been identified for performing a 
task, a sub-algorithm can be identified for performing each of the steps of 
the algorithm.
17
 In most arts, the physical, structural properties of an 
invention provide an intuitive bottom for the invention-structure equation. 
These structural properties are not functional properties at a more specific 
level of generality; they are qualitatively different types of properties. 
Once structural properties are recited as claim limitations, there is no need 
to dig deeper to find what the inventor has actually invented. In the 
software arts, however, there is no qualitative distinction between a ―goal‖ 
and a step in the algorithm for achieving that goal or a ―function‖ and a 
step in the process for implementing that function.
18
 The distinction is only 
one of degree or height on a ladder of abstraction. To allow algorithms to 
play the scope-limiting role in software that physical structures play in 
other arts, the Federal Circuit cannot employ the invention-algorithm 
equation in a rote fashion. It cannot restrict the scope of every functional 
claim limitation to an algorithm for achieving that goal. This way forward 
leads down a rabbit hole to infinite regress and madness. Rather, the 
Federal Circuit must only curtail the reach of those functional claim 
limitations that are above a threshold level of generality. Whether 
identifying and administering this unified and normatively contingent 
threshold lies within the institutional competence of an Article III court is 
highly questionable.
19
  
In sum, even though reliance on algorithms as metaphorical structure 
may represent the best hope for incremental, judicial reform of the 
problem of overbroad software claims, claim scope is likely to remain 
relatively less regulable in the software arts than in other technological 
arts. This Article cannot speak directly to the ultimate balance between the 
benefits of patent-induced incentives for innovation and the costs of patent 
litigation in the software arts.
20
 Nor can it speak directly to whether 
categorically excluding software from patentable subject matter would 
increase innovation in the software and software-related industries.
21
 More 
 
 
 17. See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 18. But see Lemley, supra note 1, at 3, 39 (building a proposal based on these distinctions). 
 19. In addition, the Supreme Court‘s prohibition on software claims to algorithms in the abstract 
throws a wrench into the invention-algorithm equation. See infra Part IV.C.3. 
 20. Cf. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 95–146 (estimating the net cost or benefit of the 
patent protection generated by the contemporary patent regime in different industries). 
 21. James Bessen and Michael Meurer seek incremental reform of software patents, but they 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/4
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narrowly, it only suggests that claim scope will always be more difficult to 
regulate in the software arts and that the costs of anomalous patent scope 
therefore need to be recognized as an entry that is permanently inked into 
the cost side of the ledger in the social-welfare analysis of software 
patents.
22
 The open question is not whether such costs exist, but rather 
how good a patch for fixing the functionality malfunction in the software 
arts can be and thus how large the costs must be.  
This Article proceeds in three substantive parts. Part II unveils and 
examines the invention-structure equation as a mechanism for curtailing 
permissible claim scope. Part III demonstrates that software inventions are 
functional entities all the way down, and it identifies the functionality 
malfunction that occurs when the invention-structure equation is brought 
to bear on purely functional technologies such as software. Part IV 
introduces the possibility of employing an invention-algorithm equation to 
fix the functionality malfunction in the software arts, and it addresses the 
difficulties that the Federal Circuit will eventually need to confront if it 
continues its initial, tentative steps down this path. 
II. THE INVENTION-STRUCTURE EQUATION  
To lay the groundwork for understanding what is unusual about the 
scope of contemporary software patents, this Part examines how patent 
law reins in the scope of functional claims in arts other than the software 
arts. Part II.A draws a distinction between structural and functional 
properties of a technology (and thus between structural and functional 
limitations in patent claims). Part II.B argues that claims with only 
functional limitations would, if permitted, be overbroad as an economic, 
normative matter. Part II.C introduces the invention-structure equation that 
patent law employs to avoid this potential overbreadth. It argues that three 
patent doctrines that have traditionally been analyzed within isolated silos 
are all manifestations of the same invention-structure equation. Part II.D 
turns to patent law‘s enablement doctrine and briefly explains why, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, enablement is not an effective, 
independent curb on the overbreadth of functional claims. 
 
 
support the exclusion of software from patentable subject matter if those incremental reforms were to 
fail. Id. at 235–53. The functionality malfunction creates a pessimistic outlook for the success of 
incremental reform. 
 22. These costs may take the form of uncertainty, rather than overbreadth, if courts compensate 
for the functionality malfunction by invalidating overbroad software patents in an ad hoc manner. See 
infra note 210. 
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A. Structural and Functional Claim Limitations 
Patent scope is the set of distinct technological things that constitute an 
inventor‘s patent interest,23 and it is determined by the patent‘s claims.24 In 
the contemporary patent regime, claims are short, textual descriptions of a 
set of technologies. They list the minimum group of properties that a 
technology must possess to be included in the claimed set.
25
 It is well 
known that claim scope can be adjusted in either of two ways. First, claims 
grow narrower as the list of recited properties grows longer: the larger the 
number of distinct properties that a technology must possess to be 
included within the claim, the smaller the set of technologies that possess 
the full list of properties. For this reason, the properties recited in a claim 
are often called ―limitations,‖ as each additional property recited further 
limits the scope of the claim.
26
 Second, assuming a constant number of 
limitations, any individual limitation can be a stronger or weaker curb on 
claim scope depending upon the generality of the language employed. A 
limitation can recite a targeted and specific property, leading to a relatively 
smaller set of described technologies and a narrower claim. Or, it can 
recite a sweepingly general property, leading to a relatively larger set of 
described technologies and a broader claim.
27
  
 
 
 23. For more nuanced definitions of patent scope, see Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of 
Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: On Thing Construction and the Meaning of 
Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 501–03 (2008) [hereinafter Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim 
Scope] (distinguishing thing-scope and meaning-scope).  
 24. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (2006) (codifying the requirement for claims); cf. Giles S. Rich, The 
Extent of the Protection and Interpretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 21 INT‘L REV. INDUS. 
PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (―[T]he name of the game is the claim.‖).  
 25. Contemporary patent claims are often called ―peripheral‖ claims because they attempt to put 
the public on notice ex ante of the outer boundaries or periphery of the claim. Peripheral claims can be 
juxtaposed with ―central‖ claims that define patent interests with exemplars or prototypes of an 
invention. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim 
Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743 (2009); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 
U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009). Technically, only peripheral claims with an open transition list the 
minimum set of properties needed for inclusion in the claimed set. Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 
F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (construing a closed transition). The doctrine of equivalents extends a 
patentee‘s rights beyond the literal scope of the claims, but, today, not by much. John R. Allison & 
Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 59 STAN. L. REV. 955 
(2007); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1157 (2011). 
 26. Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1145 (2008) (describing the mechanics of limitations).  
 27. Claim construction often hinges on disputes over the generality of limitations. See, e.g., 
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (addressing the generality of the 
meaning of the claim term ―baffle‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/4
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The conventional, two-dimensional understanding of how to modulate 
claim scope is technically accurate, but it is incomplete. It omits an 
important distinction between two qualitatively distinct types of 
limitations. Descriptive language, and thus claim limitations, can refer to a 
technology in either of two ways: it can point out either the structural or 
the functional properties of a technology.
28
 The structural properties of a 
technology include its physical, spatial, and chemical properties. For 
example, being eleven inches long is a structural property of a standard 
sheet of copy paper, being round is a structural property of a bicycle 
wheel, and being made of water is a structural property of an ice cube. In 
contrast, the functional properties of a technology are what an invention 
can do and the roles that an invention can play in a larger system. They 
include the behavioral capacities that a technology possesses and the tasks 
that a technology is capable of achieving.
29
 For example, being flexible 
(i.e., being capable of bending) is a functional property of a rubber band, 
and being capable of curing a disease is a functional property of a drug.
30
 
The structural / functional distinction is not between objects that are 
either functional or structural. Any token or concrete, particular instance of 
a technological object always possesses both structural and functional 
properties. It is therefore possible to describe any given instance of a 
technology with a claim that has either structural or functional 
 
 
 28. See Peter Kroes, Technological Explanations: The Relation Between Structure and Function 
of Technological Objects, 3 PHIL. & TECH. 18, 18 (1998) (discussing ―two different modes of 
description, viz., a structural and a functional mode of description‖ for technological objects).  
 29. The philosophical literature on functional explanation draws a distinction between the 
broader set of behavioral capacities or dispositions that an object possesses and the narrower set of 
functions of an object, the latter being informed in part by what society understands the primary 
purpose of an object to be in any given system. Richard N. Manning, Functional Explanation, in 3 
ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 802, 802–03 (Edward Craig ed., 1998). According to this 
distinction, a heart has the function of pumping blood, but it has the mere behavior of making a noise. 
Id. In patent law, the term ―functional property‖ is used in a broad sense that is interchangeable with 
the philosophical concept of a behavioral capacity or a disposition. Robert Cummins, Functional 
Analysis, 72 J. PHIL. 741, 758 (1975) (―To attribute a disposition d to an object a is to assert that the 
behavior of a is subject to (exhibits or would exhibit) a certain law-like regularity: to say a has d is to 
say that a would manifest d (shatter, dissolve) were any of a certain range of events to occur (a is put 
in water, a is struck sharply).‖). 
 30. Some descriptors that at first glance may appear to be structural in fact ―define [things in 
part] in terms of use or effect. For example, a ‗door‘ is something used to close and open a 
passageway; a ‗nail‘ is an object used to hold two pieces of material together; a ‗black‘ material is one 
incapable of reflecting visible light.‖ In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 215 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (Lane, J., 
concurring). Nonetheless, the structural / functional distinction offers a viable classification system in 
most instances. The use of the structural / functional distinction in areas of law other than patent law 
suggests that the distinction is relatively stable. For example, building codes rely on a parallel 
distinction when they discuss ―design‖ standards (that specify structure) and ―performance‖ standards 
(that specify behavioral capacity). See, e.g., J.L. Simmons Co. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1360, 1362 
(Ct. Cl. 1969). 
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limitations.
31
 For example, the coffee sleeve attached to the carry-out cup 
of coffee on my desk could be described as either ―a cardboard band 
encircling a paper cup‖ (a purely structural limitation or description of the 
technology) or ―a device that provides at least a ten degree temperature 
reduction between a hot liquid and an outer graspable surface‖ (a largely 
functional limitation or description of the technology).  
The structural and functional properties of an object are interrelated. 
According to the materialist worldview that predominates today, a 
technology possesses the functional properties that it does only because it 
possesses its structural properties.
32
 That is, there is a one-way dependence 
of causality from structure to function, and the structural properties of a 
technology are what make the technology capable of exhibiting the 
behaviors that it does. For this reason, the structural properties of a 
technology are commonly viewed as an answer to the ―how‖ question of 
technology: ―how [a] system will be able to perform the required function‖ 
requires ―an explanation . . . in terms of the physical structure of that 
[system].‖33 Yet, despite the causal dependence of function on structure, 
there is no one-to-one correspondence between structural and functional 
properties. Any given functional property may be caused by an array of 
distinct structural properties.
34
 A bicycle chain is flexible because it has 
one set of structural properties, whereas an elastic band is flexible because 
it has a different set of structural properties. Inversely, any given structural 
property may allow a technology to exhibit multiple, distinct behaviors.
35
 
If something possesses the structural property being made of sugar, it 
possesses both the functional properties being capable of being a food 
source for a bacterium and being capable of dissolving in water. 
Although any given object can be referred to by naming either its 
structural properties or its functional properties, the choice between 
structural and functional limitations in a claim has a significant 
implication for a patentee‘s rights: it determines claim scope. If a claim 
specifies only the structural attributes of a technology, the plain language 
 
 
 31. At a given point in time, only a functional or structural description may be possible because 
the discovery of one type of property may predates the discovery of the other. 
 32. See generally MATERIALISM AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM (David M. Rosenthal ed., 2d 
ed. 2000) (collecting significant historical and contemporary essays on materialism).  
 33. Kroes, supra note 28, at 20–21.  
 34. Wesley C. Salmon, Four Decades of Scientific Explanation, in SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 30 
(Philip Kitcher & Wesley C. Salmon eds., 1989) (discussing ―functional equivalents‖); Kroes, supra 
note 28, at 22 (noting that ―physical structure is [not] logically implied by functional requirements‖).  
 35. Kroes, supra note 28, at 23 (noting that ―the same structure may perform many different 
kinds of functions‖ and thus that ―[a] one-to-one relation between structure and function is not 
guaranteed‖).  
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of the claim encompasses any technology that possesses those attributes, 
regardless of the use, purpose, or function to which the technology is 
eventually put by a user.
36
 For example, a claim to a chemical entity with 
only limitations referencing the entity‘s molecular structure will 
encompass molecules that have the specified structure, regardless of 
whether the molecules are being used as a combustible fuel, a lubricant, or 
a nutrition supplement. Inversely, the plain meaning of a claim to a 
chemical entity with only functional limitations will encompass any 
compound that possesses the requisite behavioral capacities, regardless of 
the molecular structure of the entity. Compounds with radically different 
structures all fall within the scope of a functional product claim construed 
according to its plain meaning, so long as the different structures all give 
rise to behavioral capacities that satisfy the claim‘s functional 
limitations.
37
  
B. The Overbreadth of Functional Claims 
A social welfare analysis of optimal claim scope involves a classic 
balancing analysis. All other things being equal, inventors prefer broader 
claims and their potential to generate larger private benefits.
38
 In turn, 
larger private benefits can lead to greater social benefits in the form of a 
stronger incentive to innovate.
39
 However, the inseparable flip side of 
broader claims is that they generate an array of larger social costs, too. 
Static costs increase as higher prices push more end consumers out of the 
market.
40
 Greater dynamic costs follow from a more pronounced slow-
down in future innovation.
41
 To the extent that broader claims lead to more 
overlapping patent interests, broader claims can also generate larger 
 
 
 36. Claims with only structural limitations do not recite the use to which a technology is put as a 
limitation, so the use is an additional element in the allegedly infringing device that is irrelevant to 
literal infringement. See Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1178 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting that 
―comprising‖ claims read on devices with additional elements).  
 37. Of course, if the meaning of a claim is determined using a special rule that does not comport 
with the normal rules of claim construction, it could be much narrower. See infra text accompanying 
notes 123–25 (presenting the rules of means-plus-function claiming).  
 38. See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between claim 
scope and market power). The most important ―other thing‖ that might not be equal is validity: broader 
claims are more likely to be invalid, and inventors presumably prefer valid claims. 
 39. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, 85TH CONG., AN 
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup) 
(presenting a historical overview of several justifications of the patent regime, including the incentive-
to-invent justification). 
 40. SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 36–37 (2004).  
 41. Id. at 125–59.  
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administrative costs as acquiring the patent rights needed to undertake a 
research agenda or manufacture a product becomes, at best, more costly 
and, at worst, not feasible.
42
 These costs mean that additional increments 
of claim scope are likely to generate a net social cost at some point in the 
gradual expansion of claim scope. 
To curtail claim scope, patent law employs a commensurability 
principle: the scope of an inventor‘s claim should remain proportional to 
the contribution that an inventor makes to technological progress.
43
 More 
precisely, the commensurability principle mandates that the set of things 
within the scope of a claim must track the set of things that embody an 
inventor‘s innovative ideas.44  
If they were to be sanctioned, purely functional claims would 
frequently grant inventors excessively broad claims and violate the 
commensurability principle.
45
 This section offers three arguments to 
defend this assertion and demonstrate that functional claims are 
particularly problematic from a social welfare perspective.
46
 First, 
 
 
 42. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698 (1998); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent 
Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY & THE 
ECONOMY 119 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds., 2001).  
 43. For a wide-ranging discussion about the value of proportionality in intellectual property that 
goes far beyond the targeted arguments about the commensurability of technological contribution and 
claim scope made here, see ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 159–92 
(2011). Some justifications of patent protection do not rely on the commensurability principle. For 
example, prospect theory—and the social benefit of coordinated, less wasteful follow-on improvement 
that it highlights—could be invoked to defend functional claims even if they are not commensurate 
with an inventor‘s contribution. See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 
20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). The importance of prospect theory has been questioned by many scholars. 
See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 1, at 54 n.175; Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications 
for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 (2004); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On 
the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 868–908 (1990). Furthermore, even 
if prospect theory can be used to justify patent rights, it is far from clear that identifying behavioral 
capacities represents the best way of divvying up innovation into distinct prospects.  
 44. Kevin Emerson Collins, Getting into the “Spirit” of Innovative Things: Looking to 
Complementary and Substitute Properties to Shape Patent Protection for Improvements, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1217, 1273–79 (2011) [hereinafter Collins, Getting into the “Spirit”]. Patent rewards and 
the social value of inventions are self-aligning in the sense that patent rewards are determined in part 
by market demand for patented inventions. Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 393, 402 (1960) (―That is one of the beauties of the patent system. The reward is measured 
automatically by the popularity of the contribution.‖). However, the market aligns the private rewards 
of patents and the social values of inventions only if one assumes that patent doctrine has a good 
system for tracking the set of things that embody an inventor‘s ideas. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Levels 
of Abstraction Problem in Patent Law, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (2011) (framing this tracking 
problem as a levels-of-generality problem).  
 45. This section assumes that the functional claim limitations recite a previously unrealized 
technological behavior and that the claim is novel and nonobvious in relation to the prior art.  
 46. Surprisingly, despite the well-known nature of the prohibition on functional claims in patent 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss5/4
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functional claims are unusually likely to encompass later-developed 
technologies that owe no debt at all to the contribution to technological 
progress made by a patentee. Second, they are unusually likely to reach 
toward markets and give patent owners significant market power.
47
 Third, 
their absence need never deprive a deserving inventor of patent protection. 
A prohibition on functional claims only trims back the scope of protection 
at the margin, increasing the public ―spillover‖ of patent rights.48 In sum, 
the overbreadth problem lies in a combination of the nature of the after-
arising technology that such claims encompass and the availability of 
robust patent protection for meritorious inventions without resort to such 
claims. 
Before addressing these arguments in detail, it is important to dismiss 
one line in the sand that is commonly, but incorrectly, drawn to identify a 
claim whose scope exceeds an inventor‘s contribution. It is commonly 
argued that a claim by definition reaches beyond an inventor‘s 
contribution if it literally encompasses after-arising or later-developed 
technology.
49
 If this bright-line rule were correct, then functional claims 
would be per se overbroad. However, the commensurability principle 
should not be interpreted to forbid literal claim scope from growing over 
time to encompass after-arising technologies that inventors did not 
themselves make available to the public.
50
 Innovation is often cumulative: 
the later-developed embodiment can be an improvement that results from 
the later inventor employing the earlier inventor‘s contribution as a 
 
 
law, no comprehensive normative defense of this prohibition has to date been articulated. The 
arguments presented here represent a first sketch of a defense. 
 47. Another concern distinct from overbreadth is that functional claims are inherently more 
vague than structurally defined claims. While this is true under limited conditions, see infra note 245, 
those conditions are not common in the software arts. 
 48. For a wide-ranging discussion of the value of spillovers in intellectual property law, see Brett 
M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007).  
 49. See, e.g., IPPV Enters. v. Echostar Commc‘ns Corp., 106 F. Supp. 595, 606 (D. Del. 2000) 
(―[L]ater developed technologies may not fall within the literal scope of the patent.‖); Charles W. 
Adams, Allocating Patent Rights Between Earlier and Later Inventions, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 55 
(2009); Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent Scope, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151 (2005); Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession 
Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 37–40 (2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 
59 SMU L. REV. 123 (2006).  
 50. Collins, Getting into the “Spirit,” supra note 44, at 1260–68, 1296–1302 (discussing 
overlooked, ―easy‖ improvement cases); cf. Kevin Emerson Collins, Enabling After-Arising 
Technology, 34 J. CORP. L. 1083, 1098–1124 (2009) [hereinafter Collins, Enabling] (identifying three 
conditions under which literal claims routinely encompass after-arising technology); Collins, The 
Reach of Literal Claim Scope, supra note 23, at 536–53 (explaining how the meaning of claim 
language can remain fixed even as the set of things encompassed within a claim grows over time).  
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platform.
51
 In many improvement cases, the earlier inventor‘s ideas are 
still embodied—perhaps in full—in the later-developed technology, 
despite the fact that the later inventor‘s ideas are also embodied in the 
technology.
52
 In these cases, commensurability between contribution and 
claim scope requires allowing the earlier inventor‘s claim to encompass 
the later-developed improvement. 
1. Reaching Beyond an Inventor’s Contribution  
Assume that an earlier inventor is the first person to reduce to practice 
a device that is capable of performing a function, that this inventor obtains 
a functional claim to his invention, and that a later inventor invents a 
device that is also capable of performing the claimed function but that is 
structurally distinct from the device reduced to practice by the earlier 
inventor. In this situation, there are two possible relationships between the 
earlier and later inventors. First, the later inventor may owe no intellectual 
debt at all to the earlier inventor, making the normative argument that the 
functional claim over rewards the earlier inventor an easy one to mount. 
Second, the later inventor may owe an intellectual debt to the earlier 
inventor, making the normative defense of a prohibition on functional 
claims more complicated. 
First, functional claims can reach entirely beyond an inventor‘s 
contribution and into after-arising technology that owes no debt at all to 
the inventor.
53
 In order to obtain a functional claim, an inventor does not 
need to prove that he was the first person to imagine or think up the 
 
 
 51. Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the 
Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29 (1991).  
 52. The counterintuitive notion that an improvement fully embodies the contributions made by 
both an earlier inventor and a later inventor becomes easy to see if inventions are viewed as sets of 
properties of things, rather than as things or ideas. Collins, Getting into the “Spirit,” supra note 44, at 
1235–42, 1255–73.  
 53. When determining if a later inventor owes a debt to an earlier inventor, both actual and 
constructive debts must be considered. Patent infringement does not require proof of copying, and 
there is no independent invention defense in patent law. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor 
Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1328–30 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Therefore, someone who infringes a patent by 
making the exact technology disclosed in the patent‘s specification may be an independent inventor 
who did not actually learn anything from the patentee. However, the infringer is charged with a 
constructive debt to the patentee under the commensurability principle: had he known about and read 
the earlier patent, then he would have learned how to make and use the disclosed technology. 
Similarly, in determining whether the later inventor of an after-arising technology owes a debt to an 
earlier inventor and patentee, it does not matter whether the later inventor actually read the earlier-
issued patent. He owes a constructive debt to the earlier patentee if, after reading the patent, he would 
have learned information that would have made his later invention easier to achieve. 
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behavioral capacities that define claim scope.
54
 A claim defined by a long-
desired behavioral capacity is novel and nonobvious in relation to the prior 
art even if an inventor is merely the first person to reduce to practice or 
enable a technology that possesses the behavioral capacity.
55
 Here, the 
inventor‘s contribution is only one means of achieving the behavioral 
capacity. Yet, a functional claim would encompass all technologies that 
possess the behavioral capacity, including those later-developed 
technologies that employ entirely unrelated means for achieving it and that 
therefore owe no debt at all to the contribution of the earlier inventor and 
patentee. The patentee‘s contribution is only one answer to the ―how‖ 
question of technology, and the inventor of the later-developed technology 
offers an unrelated answer to that question.
56
 
Consider a historical example. In O’Reilly v. Morse, Samuel Morse‘s 
broad, functional claim to the telegraph infamously described any device 
that used ―the motive power of the electric or galvanic current . . . for 
marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, at any 
distances.‖57 It would be difficult to fathom that Morse himself was the 
first to think up the idea of a technology that possessed the claimed 
behavioral capacity or to recognize the value of a device with the claimed 
functional property.
58
 Rather, the functional claim limitations describe a 
long-felt consumer need. Morse‘s contribution to technological progress 
was being the first inventor to successfully achieve the difficult task of 
reducing to practice a telegraph machine that exhibited the claimed 
behavioral capacity. In this situation, a subsequent inventor may develop a 
different means of achieving the claimed behavior that is independent of 
Morse‘s entire contribution to technological progress. The later inventor 
 
 
 54. In plain English, one might say that an inventor did not ―conceive of‖ or ―invent‖ the 
behavioral capacity. However, these terms are often used in patent discourse in a way that is wound up 
with the structural properties of things. See infra note 174. This Article therefore describes inventors as 
―imagining‖ or ―thinking up‖ behavioral capacities. 
 55. The articulation of a long-desired property in a prior art publication does not anticipate a 
claim to a machine that possesses that property. A publication anticipates a claim only if it enables an 
embodiment within the scope of the claim. Paperless Accounting, Inc. v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Sys., 
804 F.2d 659, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (discussing anticipatory enablement).  
 56. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (defining the ―how‖ question). 
 57. O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853). The Supreme Court invalidated this 
claim due to overbreadth. See infra text accompanying notes 106–08.  
 58. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 107 (noting that the idea of the telegraph was a ―conviction . . . general 
among men of science everywhere‖ at the time of Morse‘s invention); see also ROBERT PATRICK 
MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 88–90 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
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may owe no debt at all to Morse‘s contribution to technological progress,59 
and he may not have benefited from standing on the shoulders of the 
earlier inventor. The later inventor would be in an identical position to 
generate the after-arising technology even if Morse had never made his 
invention and Morse‘s patent disclosure had never been publicized.  
Second, functional claims granted to an earlier inventor can sometimes 
encompass after-arising technology that does owe a debt to the earlier 
inventor. Here, the earlier inventor is not simply the first person to reduce 
to practice a device that exhibits the claimed behavior. Rather, he is more 
of a pioneer in that he is the first person to imagine the claimed behavior 
itself. In this situation, there is concededly a stronger argument under the 
commensurability principle in favor of upholding a functional claim. The 
very idea of a technology that exhibits the claimed behavior can 
legitimately be said to be part of the earlier inventor‘s contribution to 
technological progress, and any technology that exhibits that behavior can 
be said to embody the earlier inventor‘s idea. Here, a later inventor may 
owe an important debt to the earlier inventor even if the structural 
properties of a later-developed device are wholly independent of the 
structural properties of the device invented and disclosed by the earlier 
inventor.  
As a contrast to Morse‘s functional claim, consider the functional claim 
at issue in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker.
60
 An inventor 
made an improvement in a device for recording the depth of an oil well.
61
 
More specifically, he realized that the echoes of sound waves that have 
bounced off the shoulders of pipes at pipe junctions could be a valuable 
calibration measurement to figure out just how fast sound was traveling in 
the well. The inventor sought, and received, a functional claim to a ―means 
. . . for tuning [an echo-recording device] to the frequency of echoes [from 
shoulders of pipes] . . . to clearly distinguish the echoes . . . from each 
other.‖62 In Halliburton, the inventor was the person who thought up the 
idea of a technology that possessed the claimed behavioral capacity. 
Devices for distinguishing the echoes from the shoulders of pipes in oil 
wells were not long-felt consumer needs. 
Yet, even in this Halliburton situation that is most favorable to the 
inventor, functional patent claims are overbroad in relation to an 
 
 
 59. More precisely, the later inventor may not even owe a constructive debt to Morse. See supra 
note 53. 
 60. 329 U.S. 1 (1946).  
 61. Id. at 7–8.  
 62. Id. at 10. 
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inventor‘s contribution.63 The argument to defend the invalidity of the 
Halliburton claim is more complex than the argument required to defend 
the invalidity of the O’Reilly claim: a behavioral capacity is not the type of 
contribution to technological progress to which the scope of a patent claim 
must remain commensurate. The following two subsections provide 
support for this argument.  
2. Reaching Toward Markets 
Markets are defined by consumer purchasing behavior: they are 
categories of goods from which consumers will not switch away upon a 
small, non-transitory increase in price.
64
 This sticky purchasing behavior 
develops only if goods within a market are sufficiently close economic 
substitutes for other goods within the market but not for goods outside of 
the market.
65
 In turn, market power is the ability of a producer to raise 
price in a non-transitory fashion without consumer defection.
66
 In a 
perfectly competitive market, no producer has market power. Identical 
goods produced by two different producers are presumptively perfect 
substitutes for a consumer, and any price increase by a producer causes 
consumers to switch away from that producer‘s good to an identical good 
made by a different producer. In order for a producer to obtain market 
 
 
 63. The Supreme Court invalidated the Halliburton claim. See infra text accompanying notes 
120–22. However, there are some historical cases in which inventors have thought up a behavioral 
capacity and courts have upheld largely functional claims. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 58, at 96 
(arguing that Alexander Graham Bell‘s broad functional claim was commensurate with his 
technological contribution because Bell thought up the claimed behavioral capacity).  
 64. PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 2A ANTITRUST LAW 179–246 (2d ed. 2002). 
The traditional antitrust definition of a market is binary, but the relevant question in intellectual 
property is arguably about the degree of substitutability on a continuum. See Louis Kaplow, Why 
(Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 506–08 (2010).  
 65. In the everyday sense of the word, ―substitutes‖ are goods that can replace or fill in for each 
other because they satisfy the same consumer need. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 
1354 (3d ed. 2000) (defining a substitute as ―one that takes the place of another; a replacement‖). Nails 
and industrial strength glue for bonding wood are substitute goods in this common-sense way: I use 
either one, but probably not both, to join pieces of wood. To determine whether goods are substitutes 
as a technical, economic matter, economists measure the goods‘ cross-price elasticity of demand. Two 
goods are substitutes if a decrease in the price of one good results in a decrease in demand of the other 
good and, inversely, an increase in the price of one good results in an increase in demand for the other 
good. ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 36 (7th ed. 2008). This 
technical definition usually maps onto the common-sense definition of a substitute. If consumers are 
willing to use either one good or the other to fulfill their needs, then a decrease in the price of one will 
drive consumers toward that good and away from the other. The cheaper nails are, the less likely I am 
to buy an industrial-strength glue when either one or the other can be used to achieve the desired goal 
of attaching pieces of wood.  
 66. AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 64, at 89.  
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power, there must be some barrier to entry that prevents other producers 
from making goods that consumers view as sufficiently close substitutes. 
Patents can be the needed barrier to entry. If a good is patented, 
producers other than the patent owner cannot legally produce the good, or 
at least cannot do so without paying for a license. However, most patents 
do not generate significant market power.
67
 Market power is contingent on 
the relationship between the scope of a patent and the scope of a market. If 
the scope of a patent and a market are coextensive, or the market is a 
subset of the patent, a patent grants its owner significant market power. 
However, the scope of a patent rarely encompasses an entire market. 
Sometimes, there are goods beyond the scope of a patent that are perfect 
economic substitutes for the patented goods, meaning that the patent does 
not grant its owner any market power at all.
68
 In between these extremes, a 
patent owner may have market power that falls anywhere on a continuum 
from strong to weak, depending upon just how close the economic 
substitutes beyond the scope of the patent are.
69
 The more distant the 
closest, unclaimed substitute technology is, the greater the rent that the 
inventor can expect from a patent.
70
 More extensive patent scope is 
therefore imperfectly correlated with greater market power. Broader 
claims are more likely to encompass the full set of reasonable economic 
substitutes and to leave only more imperfect substitutes as the unpatented 
competition.  
A functional claim is unusually likely to map onto an entire market, or, 
at least, to reach toward a market and create significant market power.
71
 
The reason why is that markets, too, are often defined by the very 
functional properties of goods that are used to mark the outer boundary of 
a functional claim. Consumer preferences determine whether goods are 
economic substitutes, and consumer preferences are usually keyed to what 
a technology can do, i.e., to its behavioral capacities. Inversely stated, 
 
 
 67. Ill. Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 43 n.4 (2006) (agreeing with ―the vast 
majority of academic literature‖ that market power should not be inferred from the existence of a 
patent). Of course, one reason why patents rarely generate market power today is the doctrinal 
prohibition within patent law on functional claims—the very prohibition that this section seeks to 
justify.  
 68. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 374 (2003). 
 69. Id. at 376 (noting the degree of market power depends on ―how elastic . . . the demand of a 
given good‖ is).  
 70. SCOTCHMER, supra note 40, at 103–07.  
 71. See Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market 
Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2112 (2012) (noting that when ―patentees claim any 
device that performs a particular function‖ the claim ―will often, though not always, coincide with 
market power‖). 
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consumers are often indifferent to the structural properties of a technology 
in and of themselves, so long, of course, as different structural properties 
do not give rise to different functional properties. A consumer wants a 
coffee sleeve that prevents his fingers from being singed by the heat 
dissipating through a disposable coffee cup; he is indifferent to whether 
that heat-dissipating function is performed by a substance that has the 
structure of corrugated cardboard or cork. A consumer who has an itch in 
the middle of her back does not say to herself, ―I want a long stick with 
pointy claws on the end, and nothing else.‖ Rather, she says, ―I want 
something that will scratch this hard-to-reach itch, and nothing else.‖ 
Given the primary importance of a technology‘s function and the 
secondary importance of its structure in consumers‘ utility functions, 
markets are commonly composed of a genus of goods that all perform the 
same, or similar, functions for their end users.
72
 In sum, goods that have 
the same behavioral capacities are frequently economic substitutes in the 
same market, and functional claims that encompass all goods that have a 
behavioral capacity readily map onto markets.  
Because they reach toward markets, functional claims generate 
unusually significant static, dynamic, and administrative costs. These 
elevated costs are most notable when they are compared to the costs of 
claims that include structural limitations and that are thus limited to one 
answer to the ―how‖ question of technology.73  
Functional claims that reach toward markets entail larger static costs: 
more market power for the patent owners means that more consumers are 
priced out of the market. In contrast, if a claim is limited to one structural 
means of achieving a functionally specified goal, it is more likely that 
there will be non-infringing economic substitutes and less market power. 
There is some consensus that patent protection provides sufficient 
incentives for innovation when it does not encompass entire markets but 
rather facilitates monopolistic competition in which producers have 
exclusive rights to products that are reasonable, but imperfect, 
substitutes.
74
 Functional claims that reach toward markets are unlikely to 
strike this balance. 
 
 
 72. This is clearly an oversimplification. For example, branding also influences consumer 
preferences. Some people want an iPod, not a generic portable digital music player, and this consumer 
preference can impact market power. Id. at 2080–91.  
 73. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 74. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2148 
(―[W]e protect most IP not because we expect that it will create monopoly, but rather because it will 
create sufficient product differentiation to justify short-run returns above marginal cost that are 
sufficient to incentivize the significant fixed cost investment that innovation requires.‖); Edmund W. 
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Functional claims that encompass markets also entail unusually large 
dynamic costs. When claim scope is limited only by a behavioral capacity 
that defines a market, competitors are likely to recognize in advance of 
even trying that they cannot design around the claim. They foresee that 
they will be unlikely to be able to invent a non-infringing technology that, 
at the same time, serves as a reasonable economic substitute for consumers 
and yet does not have the behavioral capacity that defines claim scope. In 
turn, the ex ante realization that design-around will not be successful 
significantly dampens entrepreneurial interest in follow-on innovation.
75
 In 
the words of the Supreme Court, it is possible that ―inventive genius may 
evolve many more devices‖ in addition to the device disclosed by an 
inventor ―to accomplish the same [claimed] purpose‖ or function, but the 
―inventive genius‖ may choose not to invest the resources needed to invent 
the new devices because he is ―frightened from the course of 
experimentation by broad functional claims.‖76 In contrast, when the 
structural properties of goods that embody one answer to the ―how‖ 
question of technology are included as claim limitations, competitors are 
likely to be more optimistic about the likelihood of successful design 
 
 
Kitch, Property Rights in Inventions, Writings, and Marks, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 119, 122–23 
(1990) (―The claims of most issued patents are so narrow that competitors can devise many ways of 
achieving the same thing as the subject matter of the claim.‖); Lemley & McKenna, supra note 71, at 
2088 (―Many product patents do little more than create relatively minor enhancements in a product 
that make it distinctive to one group of customers, and competitors in that product are likely to have 
their own offsetting patented enhancements. As a result, the markets for automobiles, vacuum 
cleaners, cleansers, and pharmaceuticals are characterized by numerous patents, most of which suffice 
to make their products somewhat distinctive in a product differentiated market.‖). 
 75. Courts describe the incentive to design around a patent as a socially beneficial incentive. See, 
e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985). However, some 
scholars argue that designing around patents is social waste that should be deterred. Compare James 
Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation, 40 RAND J. ECON. 611, 613 
(2009) (―[A]n important role of patents is to encourage innovative activity on the part of others who 
would otherwise be inclined merely to imitate.‖), with Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for 
Patent Races over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803, 807 (2007) (emphasizing the duplicative, socially 
wasteful efforts entailed in designing around a patent). Subsequent inventors confronted with a 
functional claim still have some incentive to engage in follow-on innovation to the extent that they can 
obtain a subservient, blocking patent on an improved machine for achieving the claimed function. 
However, the incentive is reduced because subsequent inventors know that, even if they can obtain a 
license to make the improvement, they will have to channel part of their profit back to the earlier 
patentee. Scotchmer, supra note 51, at 33–34.  
 76. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1, 12 (1946). The dynamic costs of 
functional claims also create feedback that leads to static costs over a larger fraction of a patent‘s term. 
Economists often assume that successful design around reduces the effective term of a patent and thus 
the static costs of patent protection. See Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of 
Profit in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. ECON. 20, 22–25 (1995); Ted O‘Donoghue et al., Patent 
Breadth, Patent Life, and the Pace of Technological Progress, 7 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 20 
(1998). By reducing design-around activities, functional claims increase static costs. 
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around. They can find another answer to the ―how‖ question more readily 
than they can shift consumers‘ utility functions and make consumers 
desire a technology that does something different. 
Functional claims that reach toward markets may also lead to unusually 
significant administrative costs in the form of overlapping patent rights. 
Patent term lasts twenty years from the date a patent application is filed as 
a legal matter.
77
 However, technological obsolescence means that the 
technology described by a patent claim may lose its commercial value 
before the legal term of a patent ends, making the effective term of a 
patent less than its legal term.
78
 When a functional claim reaches toward a 
market and patent scope is limited only by the behavioral capacity of a 
technology, the patented technology is less likely to lose its commercial 
value before the end of the patent‘s legal term. Consumers‘ functional 
needs are more stable over time than the structural answers to the ―how‖ 
question of technology. As a result, functional claims remain 
commercially valuable for a longer period of time, leading to a greater 
number of overlapping patents on any given technological good. 
The costs generated by the ability of functional claims to reach toward 
and encompass markets provide an economic argument against functional 
claims that is concededly both under- and over-exclusive. It is under-
exclusive in that claims defined partially or even solely by structural 
limitations sometimes give a patent owner significant market power. If a 
structural claim describes a bottleneck technology for which there are no 
reasonable economic substitutes, then it, too, may grant an inventor 
significant market power.
79
 More significantly, the argument is over-
exclusive in that not all functional claims will be broad enough to 
encompass or even reach toward markets. Like other limitations, 
functional limitations exist on a wide range of levels of generality.
80
 Only 
the more general of the functional claims are likely to map onto markets 
and generate unusually significant social costs. 
On the general end of the spectrum, patent limitations may recite a 
behavior that is an end-user preference—that is, a behavior that is directly 
valued by an end consumer and that may even define the consumer‘s need 
itself. Because markets are strongly influenced by consumer preferences, 
 
 
 77. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006). 
 78. See supra note 76. 
 79. Cf. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 440 (2004) (noting that claims 
with narrow scope can still be economically valuable). Of course, it is often possible to design around 
a structural claim by inventing economic substitutes with different structural properties but the same 
functional properties. Cf. supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 80. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
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claims with limitations that describe end-user preferences are particularly 
likely to map onto markets.
81
 For example, Morse‘s claim describes a set 
of technologies by describing an end-user preference: consumers want a 
device capable of communicating at a distance.
82
  
On the specific end of the spectrum, functional limitations may not 
define an end-user preference. They may instead describe only one of 
several, alternative ways in which an end-user preference can be fulfilled, 
and they may thus be functional analogs of the answers to the ―how‖ 
question of technology that are usually provided by a recitation of a 
technology‘s structure.83 These specific behaviors can be called how-
functions. A functional claim reciting a how-function is less likely to 
encompass a market, as there are non-infringing technologies that satisfy 
the end-user preference and that are economic substitutes for the claimed 
technology.
84
 For example, the claim to a device for measuring the depth 
of oil wells in Halliburton arguably recites a how-function.
85
 Consumers 
are not likely motivated to purchase a means for measuring echoes from 
the shoulders of pipe joints in an oil well per se; they want to purchase a 
means of measuring the depth of oil wells, however that goal is 
accomplished. It is possible that methods of measuring the depth of oil 
wells that did not involve measuring echoes from the pipe junctions—or 
that did not involve measuring echoes at all—already existed or could be 
developed, leaving reasonable substitutes beyond the scope of the claim.  
To sum up, a prohibition on functional claims is over-exclusive 
because it invalidates not only functional claims that describe highly 
general end-user preferences but also functional claims that describe 
narrowly drawn how-functions. Yet, despite this over-exclusiveness, a 
prohibition on purely functional claims is a reasonable proxy for a 
prohibition on claims that reach toward markets.
86
 The reason is that 
neither a straight-up market analysis nor a more narrowly tailored proxy is 
administratively feasible. 
In theory, one could imagine a patent regime that incorporated a 
straight-up market analysis as a validity requirement. Patent claims that 
grant excessive market power could be narrowed or invalidated, regardless 
 
 
 81. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text. 
 82. See supra text accompanying note 57. 
 83. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text. 
 84. A functional claim could in theory recite such an exacting set of performance requirements 
that only a single structural device infringes. 
 85. See supra text accompanying notes 60–62. 
 86. Patent law‘s prohibition on functional claims is thus a largely unexplored aspect of the 
antitrust-patent interface that is embedded within patent law‘s validity rules.  
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of whether they are functionally or structurally defined. However, such a 
regime would not be feasible as a practical matter. Contemporary patent 
law does not attempt to define markets in their technical sense, and with 
good reason.
87
 If claim validity is to remain stable, the relevant question in 
the assessment of permissible claim scope cannot be based on a 
conventional static market analysis, namely whether there are currently 
available substitutes beyond the scope of a patent. Rather, the question 
would have to focus on whether follow-on innovation is likely to produce 
non-infringing substitute products in the near future. Given the complex 
and speculative nature of the identification of innovation markets in an 
antitrust analysis,
88
 answering a similar question as a routine part of the 
doctrinal analysis of permissible claim scope would be an extremely 
unwieldy exercise. 
Alternatively, one could imagine a patent regime with a prohibition on 
functional claims that is more narrowly tailored to the functional claims 
that are unusually likely to reach toward or encompass markets. For 
example, perhaps only claims with functional limitations reciting end-user 
preferences could be invalidated, and claims with functional limitations 
reciting how-functions could be sanctioned.
89
 Yet, while this distinction 
accurately identifies two ideal types, it is untenable as a legal distinction 
for determining claim validity. The distinction would require judges and 
examiners to differentiate the more fundamental needs that motivate 
consumer decisions from the mere means through which consumers 
choose to satisfy those needs. Defining consumer preferences directly in 
the minds of consumers, rather than inferring them from purchasing 
behavior, is not a task that any economist or lawyer should undertake 
lightly. The only administrable proxy for claims to end-user preferences is 
therefore an over-exclusive prohibition on all functional claims.
90
  
 
 
 87. Even though understanding markets is essential for understanding the private and social 
welfare effects of intellectual property, intellectual property doctrine shies away from the formal 
identification of markets. See Lemley & McKenna, supra note 71, at 2059–77. 
 88. Hovenkamp, supra note 74, at 2135 (―[M]arket power assessment will probably never do a 
good job of taking innovation into account because innovation is so badly behaved . . . .‖); Herbert 
Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 254–60 (2007).  
 89. See supra text accompanying notes 81–85.  
 90. The enablement doctrine cannot create a more closely tailored proxy, either. See infra Part 
II.D. 
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3. Plugging up Spillovers 
A final argument in support of prohibiting purely functional claims 
considers the alternative types of claims that are available for providing an 
incentive to innovate. If functional claims were to be prohibited, what 
protection would be left for inventors? Functional claims can be deemed to 
be impermissibly overbroad in part because the patent protection that is 
available in the absence of such claims is robust.
91
 No inventor who could 
obtain a purely functional claim if such claims were permitted would be 
denied patent protection if such claims were not permitted. Every inventor 
who seeks a novel and nonobvious claim defined solely by one or more 
behavioral capacities can also seek a narrower claim that recites some of 
the structural properties of the technology that the inventor has actually 
produced as limitations as well. A prohibition on functional claims only 
reduces the scope of the protection to which the deserving inventor is 
entitled. It increases the ―spillover‖ of patent rights when inventors think 
up new behavioral capacities, allowing more of the benefit of innovation 
to flow to the public and less to be internalized by an inventor.
92
 Even 
absent purely functional claims, the patent regime still provides incentives 
to think up new behavioral capacities for technologies. 
C. The Hidden, Unified Design Principle  
To address the overbreadth of functionally delineated claims, patent 
law employs what this Article terms the invention-structure equation. This 
doctrinal mechanism is simple in theory, even if it is often messy in the 
details of its application. Courts first make an ontological assumption 
about the nature of an invention that merits patent protection: the identity 
or defining quality of an invention—i.e., what makes an invention the 
invention that it is—resides in some subset of the physical, structural 
properties of the technology produced by an inventor.
93
 Ontological 
 
 
 91. Debates over the optimal scope of patent protection are necessarily relative; the merits of any 
given position must be measured in relation to the merits of other possible positions. Imperfect 
solutions are frequently embraced when there is no better solution. 
 92. There is nothing inherently inefficient about positive externalities that remain uninternalized. 
See, e.g., John P. Dawson, The Self-Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1974) 
(―Uncompensated gains are pervasive and universal; our well-being and survival depend on them.‖); 
Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 48, at 258–84; Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: 
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 167–69 (1992) (―Culture is 
interdependence.‖). 
 93. For a broader argument explaining why the definition of what an inventor has invented 
should look to inventive properties of embodiments, rather than to either inventive ideas or inventive 
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rhetoric that characterizes the ―identity‖ of a protectable invention and that 
posits what a protectable invention ―is‖ litters patent opinions employing 
the invention-structure equation.
94
 With this ontology in place, the courts 
have a metric for determining whether claims are overbroad with respect 
to an inventor‘s contribution to technological progress.95 Courts 
categorically invalidate any claim delineated solely by a functional 
description of a technology as per se overbroad, and they uphold claims 
with functional limitations only if the claims also have limitations that 
refer to the physical, structural properties that define the invention. The 
first part of this inquiry is a bright-line rule, whereas the latter involves a 
detailed, and often controversial and underdetermined, inquiry into the set 
of physical, structural properties that define the protectable invention.
96
 
There is no single patent doctrine that operationalizes the invention-
structure equation. Rather, the invention-structure equation undergirds 
three patent doctrines that are conventionally viewed as largely unrelated: 
the section 101 doctrine of patentable subject matter,
97
 the Supreme 
Court‘s prohibition on functional claims (and the congressional response 
codified in section 112(f)),
98
 and the section 112(a) doctrine of written 
description.
99
 To date, these three doctrines have been studied by scholars 
 
 
embodiments as wholes, see Collins, Getting into the “Spirit,” supra note 44. 
 94. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (―A definition by function . . . does not suffice to define the [invented] genus [of technologies] 
because it is only an indication of what the [claimed invention] does, rather than what it is.‖); Amgen, 
Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (―It is not sufficient to define [a 
chemical] solely by its principal biological [i.e., functional] property . . . because an alleged conception 
having no more specificity than that is simply a wish to know the identity of any material with that 
biological property.‖); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 212 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (describing the structural 
properties of an invention as what the invention ―is‖ while describing the invention‘s functional 
properties as merely what the invention ―does‖); see also MPEP § 2173.05(g) (8th ed. Rev. 8, July 
2010). This patent-law ontology is not far removed from the common-sense ontology of things that 
follows from a materialist world view: the functional properties of a technology can be explained with 
reference to the technology‘s (presumptively more fundamental) structural properties. See supra notes 
32–33 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (discussing the commensurability principle). 
 96. One difficult issue that is inherent in the administration of the invention-structure equation is 
identifying the subset of the structural properties of a disclosed technology that defines the invention. 
This issue has yet to be addressed by the courts in a satisfying manner, and it is one on which the 
distinct doctrinal manifestations of the invention-structure equation may differ. For example, some 
cases employing the invention-structure equation suggest that the structural properties that differentiate 
an invention from the prior art (i.e., the structural points of novelty) define the invention. See, e.g., 
infra note 119. In contrast, the rules of means-plus-function claiming require all functional limitations, 
whether at the point of novelty or not, to be limited to the corresponding structures disclosed in the 
specification. See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. 
 97. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
 98. Id. § 112(f). 
 99. Id. § 112(a). Courts may also sometimes implement the invention-structure equation through 
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and applied by courts only within distinct analytical silos, likely because 
the path-dependent, historical evolution of patent law has grounded them 
in different statutes and expressed them in distinct rhetorical formulations. 
This compartmentalization has hidden the importance of the invention-
structure equation as the court‘s primary tool for curtailing the overbreadth 
of functional claims.
100
 The cross-cutting examination of the doctrines that 
follows reveals a hidden, unified design principle of the patent regime. 
Patent doctrine is, at least in one respect, less complex and fragmented 
than it initially appears.
101
  
1. Patentable Subject Matter  
Throughout the nineteenth century, courts invalidated claims that 
described ―principles‖ or ―principles in the abstract.‖102 Today, these cases 
are usually treated as cases rooted in the section 101 doctrine of patentable 
subject matter.
103
 Although the rhetoric of these opinions does not 
expressly identify functional claim language as the problem, they all 
involved claims that were defined solely by what the technology could do. 
Furthermore, in all of these cases, the courts implied that the claims would 
have been valid if, counterfactually, some of the features of the machines 
invented by the inventors—i.e., some of the structural properties of the 
claimed technology—had been added as limitations on claim scope.  
For example, in Wyeth v. Stone, Justice Story invalidated a claim for 
―cutting ice by means of any power, other than human power.‖104 This was 
 
 
the default (i.e., not 112(f)) rules of claim construction. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 
1311–24 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). They may curtail permissible claim scope by construing 
functional claim language so that it refers only to technologies that possess the structural properties 
that constitute an invention. See, e.g., Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research 
Found., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1164 (D. Nev. 2004) (construing the term ―scanning apparatus‖ 
narrowly so that it includes some structural limitations). 
 100. For example, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley do not mention the invention-structure equation in 
any of its doctrinal guises in their otherwise extensive catalog of actual and potential ―policy levers‖ 
for optimizing patent scope. See BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 122–28, 135–37.  
 101. One difference that exists within this unified design principle is the difference between 
invalidity rules and rules of claim construction. In all three areas, the courts initially implemented the 
invention-structure equation through an invalidity rule: overbroad claims are invalid. When Congress 
enacted what is now section 112(f) in 1952, it transformed the invention-structure equation into a rule 
of claim construction: overbroad claims are narrowed and upheld. See infra text accompanying notes 
123–25. 
 102. See, e.g., O‘Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 
How.) 156 (1852); Wyeth v. Stone, 30 F. Cas. 723 (C.C.D. Mass. 1840) (Story, J.); Whittemore v. 
Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1123, 1124 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (Story, J.).  
 103. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3253 (2010).  
 104. Wyeth, 30 F. Cas. at 727. 
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a functional claim: it described the behavior of which the device was 
capable without describing any of the structural properties of the device. 
The claim was thus ―broader than the actual invention‖ and impermissibly 
encompassed ―a principle in the abstract‖ because it did not recite ―any 
particular . . . machinery, by which ice is to be cut‖ as a limitation.105  
Perhaps most famously, the Supreme Court in O’Reilly v. Morse 
invalidated one of Samuel Morse‘s claims to the telegraph for 
overbreadth: ―the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic 
current . . . for marking or printing intelligible characters, signs, or letters, 
at any distances.‖106 Again, this is a functional claim: it describes the 
behavioral capacity of the device. The Court identified the problem with 
this claim as the lack of any limitation that recited the structural properties 
of the technology that Morse actually invented: the functional claim was 
overbroad because ―it matter[ed] not by what process or machinery the 
result [was] accomplished.‖107 Today, O’Reilly is often cited as a case that 
establishes a prohibition on the patenting of ―a natural law,‖ i.e., some 
aspect of nature that existed before man discovered it.
108
 This 
characterization of these cases, however, is misleading. Telegraphs are no 
more natural than run-of-the-mill patentable inventions. The problem in 
these cases was the use of functionally defined limitations to delineate 
claim scope, and these cases therefore represent the early origins of the 
invention-structure equation as a mechanism for curtailing permissible 
claim scope.  
2. Functional Claim Limitations 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court made 
explicit its objection to functional claims. The Court invalidated a series of 
patent claims on the grounds that the claims were overbroad because they 
only recited the functional properties of technology that an inventor had 
produced and thus were not limited to an inventor‘s actual invention.109 As 
 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. O’Reilly, 56 U.S. at 112. 
 107. Id. at 113; see also id. at 117 (noting that an effect as a claim limitation ―must be combined 
with, and passed through, and operate upon, certain complicated and delicate machinery‖ in order to 
yield a patentable claim).  
 108. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293–94, 1301 
(2012). 
 109. See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, 329 U.S. 1 (1946); Gen. Elec. Co. 
v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364 (1938); Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co., 277 U.S. 
245 (1928). For more in-depth treatments of these cases, see Paul M. Janicke, The Crisis in Patent 
Coverage: Defining Scope of an Invention by Function, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155 (1994); Mark D. 
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a mid-twentieth-century patent treatise noted: ―It is possible that a claim 
for all means of arriving at a desired result would be broad enough to 
cover later discovered means wholly independent of the first means for 
arriving at the same final result. In that case, the inventor would be over-
protected.‖110 In this passage, ―means‖ is code for a technology with 
particular structural properties, and ―a desired result‖ is a functional 
property. 
In Holland Furniture Co. v. Perkins Glue Co.,
111
 an inventor developed 
a starch-based glue that was useful for wood veneering because, among its 
properties, it had the low water content that previously had only been 
attainable in glue made from animal substances.
112
 The inventor obtained a 
functional claim to any starch-based glue ―having substantially the 
properties of animal glue.‖113 Claim scope was thus delineated ―not in 
terms of [the invention‘s] own physical characteristics or chemical 
properties . . . but wholly in terms of the manner of use of the product.‖114 
The Supreme Court invalidated the claim because it employed only 
functional limitations. ―A claim so broad, if allowed, would operate to 
enable the inventor who has discovered that a defined type of starch 
answers the required purpose to exclude others from all other types of 
starch‖ with different chemical compositions.115  
In General Electric Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp.,
116
 an inventor 
obtained a functional claim that encompassed tungsten filaments ―made up 
mainly of a number of comparatively large grains of such size and contour 
as to prevent substantial sagging and offsetting during a normal or 
commercially useful life for . . . a lamp or other device.‖117 The Supreme 
Court held the claim ―invalid on its face‖ because of its functional 
language.
118
 ―The claim . . . falls within the condemnation of the doctrine 
that a patentee may not broaden his product claims by describing the 
 
 
Janis, Who’s Afraid of Functional Claims? Reforming the Patent Law’s § 112, ¶ 6 Jurisprudence, 15 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231 (1999); Lemley, supra note 1, at 5–15. Congress 
reacted to these cases by enacting what is now section 112(f). See infra text accompanying notes 123–
25. 
 110. RISDALE ELLIS, PATENT CLAIMS 338–39 (1949).  
 111. 277 U.S. 245 (1928). 
 112. Id. at 247. 
 113. Id. at 250.  
 114. Id. at 256. 
 115. Id. at 257.  
 116. 304 U.S. 364 (1938). 
 117. Id. at 368. 
 118. Id.  
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product in terms of function‖ and ―vividly illustrates the vice of a 
description in terms of function‖ in a claim.119  
Similarly, in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker, an 
inventor made an improvement in a device that records the echoes of 
sound waves sent into an oil well in order to measure well depth.
120
 The 
inventor limited the scope of his claim with reference to a ―means . . . for 
tuning [an echo-recording device] to the frequency of echoes . . . to clearly 
distinguish the echoes . . . from . . . each other.‖121 The Court invalidated 
the claim, noting that the claim described the invention ―in terms of what 
it will do rather than in terms of its own physical characteristics‖ and 
opining that the claim illustrated the ―overhanging threat of the functional 
claim.‖122  
The Supreme Court cases barring purely functional claims because of 
overbreadth remain good law today, but Congress has softened their 
impact. Describing the full scope of an invention without using functional 
limitations is sometimes difficult, and invalidating any claim with a 
functional limitation might leave inventors without effective patent 
protection. Therefore, Congress responded to Halliburton by enacting 
what is now section 112(f) as part of the 1952 Patent Act:  
 
 
 119. Id. at 371. The Court further noted that ―the vice of a functional claim exists not only when a 
claim is ‗wholly‘ functional, if that is ever true, but also when the inventor is painstaking when he 
recites what has already been seen, and then uses conveniently functional language at the exact point 
of novelty.‖ Id.; see also Davis Sewing Mach. Co. v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 217 F. 775 (6th Cir. 
1914) (holding that only functional claiming at the point of novelty is prohibited). 
 120. 329 U.S. 1 (1946). 
 121. Id. at 8–9. 
 122. Id. at 9, 12. To a contemporary ear, some language in Halliburton can be taken to imply that 
functional claims are problematic because they are indefinite—that is, their boundaries are impossible 
to discern. For example, Halliburton states that functional claims ―fail adequately to describe the 
alleged invention.‖ Id. at 14. An interpretation of Halliburton that focuses on the indefiniteness of 
functional claim language shows up in recent patent cases. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 
939 F.2d 1533, 1536 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1971); 
Supplementary Examination Guidelines for Determining Compliance with 35 U.S.C. 112 and for 
Treatment of Related Issues in Patent Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 7162, 7165 (Feb. 9, 2011) 
[hereinafter PTO 112 Guidelines] (citing Halliburton for the proposition that ―when claims merely 
recite a description of a problem to be solved or a function or result achieved by the invention, the 
boundaries of the claim scope may be unclear‖). However, functional language is not inherently more 
ambiguous or vague than structural language. See infra text accompanying notes 242–44. But cf. infra 
note 245 (discussing the limited conditions under which functional claims are likely to be indefinite); 
infra note 210 (noting that the validity of functional software claims may be uncertain if courts 
invalidate them for overbreadth on an ad hoc basis). When Halliburton is viewed in light of the 
invention-structure equation, the statement that functional claim language fails to describe the 
invention means that the inventor‘s protectable invention resides in the structural properties of the 
technology that he produces and that the claim is overbroad because it does not recite those properties 
as limitations.  
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An element in a claim . . . may be expressed as a means or step for 
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, 
material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be 
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
123
  
This provision embodies a compromise. It allows functional claim 
limitations, but it requires that the scope of those limitations be determined 
using a special scope-restricting rule of claim construction: the functional 
language refers only to devices that have the ―corresponding structure‖ or 
―material‖ that the patentee discloses in the specification, as well as its 
equivalents.
124
 Because functional claim limitations are often drafted as a 
―means for‖ performing a function, limitations construed according to the 
rule set forth in section 112(f) are called means-plus-function 
limitations.
125
  
In sum, the statutory rule restricts the scope of functional claim 
limitations to things that possess the structural properties that an inventor 
discloses in the specification. It turns the invention-structure equation into 
a rule of claim construction, eliminating the problem of overbroad claims 
before it arises and obviating the need to invalidate overbroad, functional 
claims.  
3. The Written Description Requirement 
Within the last two decades, the Federal Circuit has given birth to yet 
another doctrine that employs the invention-structure equation as a 
mechanism for curtailing permissible claim scope: the written description 
requirement.
126
 The written description requirement mandates that the set 
of claimed technologies must remain commensurate with the set of 
technologies that the inventor ―invented‖ or ―possessed‖ at the time of 
 
 
 123. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012).  
 124. Id. Means-plus-function limitations employ a hybrid of central and peripheral techniques for 
delimiting claim scope. Cf. supra note 25. A series of limitations defines a periphery, but each of those 
limitations is defined with reference to the structural exemplar disclosed in the specification.  
 125. See, e.g., In re Henatsch, 298 F.2d 954 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
 126. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). The courts for several decades had been using the written 
description requirement to curtail the scope of claims amended during prosecution. See In re Ruschig, 
379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The recent development is the application of the written description 
requirement to claims filed with the original patent application. See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 
F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002); 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).  
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filing.
127
 As the cases discussed below demonstrate, the set of invented or 
possessed technologies is legalistic code for the set of technologies that 
possess the structural properties that constitute an invention under the 
invention-structure equation. The written description doctrine is therefore 
a variation on the theme of the Supreme Court cases from the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries that prohibit purely functional claiming.
128
 It 
is another tool for invalidating excessively functional claims for 
overbreadth.
129
 
In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co.,
130
 the 
Federal Circuit invalidated a number of claims to DNA molecules for 
failure to satisfy the written description requirement.
131
 The claims defined 
sets of DNA molecules with only a functional limitation—the claimed 
molecules had to encode for insulin, i.e., they had to possess the property 
 
 
 127. Ariad Pharm., 598 F.3d at 1351.  
 128. See supra Part II.C.1. Viewing the written description requirement as the suspenders in a 
belt-and-suspenders implementation of the invention-structure equation casts one commonly noted 
peculiarity of the written description doctrine in a new light. Most written description invalidations 
occur in the biochemical arts, and this empirical fact is conventionally interpreted to suggest that the 
Federal Circuit subjects claim scope to greater scrutiny, and allows only narrower claims, in the 
biochemical arts. See Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description 
Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 (1998); Arti K. Rai, 
Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
827, 831–38 (1999). Interestingly, the rules of means-plus-function claiming exhibit the inverse 
pattern. Functional claims in the biochemical arts are rarely, if ever, subject to the scope-narrowing 
rule of claim construction articulated in section 112(f). (This outcome may be explained in part by the 
formalistic nature of the threshold test the Federal Circuit employs to determine whether the rules of 
means-plus-function claiming apply. See infra notes 298–302 and accompanying text.) When both 
112(f) and written description are understood to be manifestations of the invention-structure equation, 
it becomes clear that the Federal Circuit uses the written description doctrine to do the exact same 
work of curtailing the overbreadth of functional claims in the biochemical arts that it uses the rules of 
means-plus-function claiming to do in other arts. The written description doctrine does not make 
claims in the biochemical arts unusually narrow. Rather, it levels the playing field. It brings the 
invention-structure equation that already governs claims in other arts to bear in the biochemical arts. 
Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of Patent 
Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PAT. L.J. 60.  
 129. The primary function of written description is commonly identified as a prohibition on claims 
that are filed too early in time, before an inventor understands the structure of any of the embodiments 
that he is claiming. See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 118. However, the not-too-early 
concern is just a limit condition of the not-too-broad concern. If an inventor has not disclosed the 
structure of any embodiment within the scope of the claims, the set of claimed technologies is never 
commensurate with the set of technologies that the inventor invented or possessed at the time of filing 
(because the set invented or possessed is a null set). The unified nature of the invention-structure 
equation can also be seen in the fact that the not-to-early written description cases are, as a matter of 
policy, indistinguishable from the means-plus-function cases in which the inventor fails to disclose any 
corresponding structure in the specification. See infra Part IV.B.1.  
 130. 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 131. Id. at 1566–69.  
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of being able to cause a cell to produce insulin.
132
 The Federal Circuit 
invalidated the functional claims for overbreadth with respect to the 
technologies that were disclosed in the patent specification. It held that, in 
order to demonstrate ―invention‖ or ―possession‖ of a claimed genus of 
molecules, the specification had to reveal to the person having ordinary 
skill in the art (the ―PHOSITA‖) the ―structural or physical 
characteristics‖—i.e., the physical, structural properties—that are shared 
by members of the genus.
133
 The functional description of the claimed 
genus provided by the claims themselves ―does not define any structural 
features commonly possessed by members of the genus,‖ and it therefore 
does not allow the PHOSITA to ―recognize the identity of the members of 
the genus.‖134 Being able to ―visualize‖ a technology lies at the heart of 
being in possession of an invention, and visualization, in turn, requires 
understanding physical structure.
135
 In sum, Eli Lilly uses the invention-
structure equation to invalidate overbroad, functional claims. 
Two more recent written description cases also demonstrate that the 
written description doctrine implements the invention-structure equation. 
In University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co.,
136
 the Federal Circuit 
invalidated a claim to a method of ―administering a non-steroidal 
compound that selectively inhibits activity of‖ a particular protein.137 The 
claim recited only a functional property of the compound, and the patent 
did not disclose—let alone recite as a limitation on claim scope—the 
structural properties of any molecule capable of achieving the desired 
function.
138
 Most recently, in Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.,
139
 the court invalidated claims to methods of reducing the binding of a 
transcription factor to a family of genes.
140
 The claims were purely 
functional—they ―encompass[ed] the use of all substances that achieve the 
desired result‖—and they were insufficiently limited by the structural 
 
 
 132. Technically, the claims described plasmids and microorganisms containing nucleotide 
sequences that encoded for insulin. Id. at 1563–64. The specification disclosed the DNA sequence of 
the insulin gene in rats, and the claims described nested classes of the insulin gene: the insulin gene in 
vertebrates, mammals, and both rats and humans. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1567; see also id. at 1569 (noting that written description ―requires a kind of specificity 
usually achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of nucleotides that [made] up‖ the DNA).  
 134. Id. at 1568. ―Identity‖ is legal code for the structural properties of an invention under the 
invention-structure equation. See supra note 94. 
 135. Eli Lilly, 598 F.3d at 1568. 
 136. 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 137. Id. at 918. 
 138. Id. at 927. 
 139. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 140. Id. at 1340. 
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properties of any molecule that could achieve that result.
141
 As the Federal 
Circuit noted in Ariad, the written description requirement ―is especially 
acute with genus claims that use functional language to define the 
boundaries of a claimed genus. In such a case, the functional claim may 
simply claim a desired result, and may do so without describing [the 
structures of the] species that achieve that result.‖142 
D. The Limits of Enablement 
The status of the invention-structure equation as the courts‘ principal 
tool for curtailing the overbreadth of functional claims has gone largely 
unappreciated. In part, this oversight flows from the heretofore hidden 
nature of the invention-structure equation as a deep design principle of 
patent law.
143
 In part, however, it also follows from an overestimation of 
the efficacy of another patent doctrine that reins in permissible claim 
scope: enablement. The conventional wisdom in patent law is that 
enablement is the courts‘ best tool for curtailing claims that reach too far 
into yet-to-be developed technologies.
144
 This belief, however, is highly 
suspect. Although enablement does curb some types of claim overbreadth, 
it is neither tasked with reining in the overbreadth of functional claims in 
most arts today nor well-suited for taking on that job tomorrow. 
 
 
 141. Id. at 1341, 1350.  
 142. Id. at 1349. The written description requirement diverges from the earlier Supreme Court 
cases administering the invention-structure equation in that the earlier cases invalidate a functionally 
drawn claim on its face whereas the written description requirement only invalidates a functionally 
drawn claim if there are insufficient structurally defined species disclosed in the specification. See id. 
(―[T]he specification must demonstrate that the applicant has made a generic invention that achieves 
the claimed result and do so by showing that that applicant has invented species sufficient to support a 
claim to the functionally-defined genus.‖). Additionally, if the PHOSITA is aware of a known 
correlation between function and structure, a claim with only functional limitations may be upheld. Id. 
at 1350. 
 143. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 144. For enablement‘s dominance in pioneering work on patent scope, see Merges & Nelson, 
supra note 43, at 845–52. More recently, enablement‘s dominance has surfaced in wide-spread 
arguments suggesting that the application of the written description doctrine to the claims originally 
filed with a patent application is superfluous in light of the enablement doctrine. See, e.g., Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976–83 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting); Mark 
D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and 
Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y 55 (2000); Mueller, supra note 
128. The dominance of enablement in general discussions about how to use patent law‘s validity 
doctrines to best tailor patent scope extends into discussions about how to tailor patent scope in the 
software arts in particular. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the Middle 
Innings, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1627 (2007). But see Lemley, supra note 1 (arguing that section 112(f) is the 
key to curtailing the scope of software claims).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
1434 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:1399 
 
 
 
 
Like the written description requirement, enablement curbs permissible 
claim scope by tethering claims to the disclosure that an inventor makes in 
the specification.
145
 However, it uses a different metric—that is, it looks to 
a different type of disclosed information—to ensure commensurability 
between an inventor‘s contribution to progress and permissible claim 
scope.
146
 It looks to a patent specification‘s teachings concerning how to 
make and use an invention. More specifically, enablement requires that the 
disclosure teach the PHOSITA how to make and use a set of technologies 
without undue experimentation that is reasonably commensurate with the 
claimed set of technologies at the time of filing.
147
 If a claim is overbroad 
with respect to the technologies that a patent disclosure teaches the 
PHOSITA to make and use, the claim is invalid for lack of enablement.  
As a descriptive matter, the enablement doctrine is not the principal 
bulwark that holds back the type of claim overbreadth generated by 
functional claims. The rules of means-plus-function claiming enforce the 
invention-structure equation as part of claim construction.
148
 Claim 
construction is the process through which courts determine the meaning of 
claim language, and it ordinarily occurs before any validity doctrine, 
including enablement, is considered.
149
 The rules of means-plus-function 
claiming therefore deal with the problem of the overbreadth of functional 
claims before enablement even enters into the picture. Functional claims 
are usually construed so that they have limitations reciting some of the 
structural properties of what an inventor has invented, meaning that 
enablement does not today have to deal with the full extent of the potential 
overbreadth problem of functional claims.
150
 Any argument that justifies 
the use of enablement as the best means of curtailing functional claims by 
extrapolating from the role that enablement plays in the contemporary 
patent regime misses the mark. Enablement operates only as a second line 
of defense against the overbreadth of functional claims. 
 
 
 145. Enablement and written description derive from intertwined words in the same statutory 
provision. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
 146. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 175–79 (noting that the enablement doctrine can 
become a manifestation of the invention-structure equation to restrict the scope of functional claims).  
 147. Nat‘l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1195–96 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
 148. See supra text accompanying notes 123–25. 
 149. The meaning of claim language affects the breadth of claim scope, and the breadth of claim 
scope is often a critical fact in the enablement analysis. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1241 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 150. Interestingly, even the doctrines that employ the invention-structure equation to invalidate 
overbroad claims have their greatest impact today in arts in which the rules of means-plus-function 
claiming are not often used. See supra note 128. 
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Of course, the status quo could be altered. The enablement doctrine 
could take on greater importance, and it could be positioned as the first, or 
perhaps only, line of defense against the overbreadth of functional claims. 
As a practical matter, however, enablement would be ill-suited to serving 
this role. Enablement has a blind spot. The enablement analysis is rooted 
in time on the date on which a patent application is filed,
151
 and there is a 
type of overbreadth that cannot be seen by this time-bound PHOSITA: 
claimed embodiments that are unforeseeable or ―unknown concepts‖ on 
that date.
152
 This is precisely the type of overbreadth that functional claims 
create, making enablement a poor tool to use to curtail the overbreadth of 
functional claims. 
Enablement challenges all involve allegations of gap technologies—
that is, technologies that fall within the broader scope of a claim but not 
within the narrower set of technologies enabled by the specification. Most 
successful enablement challenges that invalidate claims involve gap 
technologies that were known concepts on the filing date, but that were not 
yet reduced to practice at that time. In this situation, the PHOSITA can 
readily imagine, conceptualize, or point to the gap technologies on the date 
of filing, allowing the lack of commensurability to be proven on that date. 
For example, in Plant Genetic Systems v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., a patent 
broadly claimed ―a plant cell‖ that had been transformed with a gene that 
endowed the cells with herbicide resistance.
153
 The patent specification 
taught the PHOSITA how to make transformed dicot cells but not 
transformed monocot cells, making the transformed monocot cells the gap 
embodiments.
154
 The Federal Circuit invalidated the cell claims for lack of 
enablement because these gap embodiments were ―not an unknown 
concept‖ on the date of filing but were rather ―specifically desired but 
difficult to obtain‖ at that time.155 Similarly, in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
 
 
 151. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
 152. Plant Genetic Sys. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For a 
lengthier exposition of the role of unforeseeability in enablement, see Collins, Enabling, supra note 
50, at 1098–105. Enablement‘s blind spot results from what Rob Merges has famously called the 
temporal paradox of enablement and claim construction: enablement is performed on the date of filing, 
whereas claim construction is performed on the date of infringement. MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 
58, at 295–97; Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady-
Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REV. 359, 379 n.73 (1992). However, because black-letter patent law in 
fact grounds both enablement and claim construction on the date of filing, the paradox underlying 
enablement‘s blind spot is more accurately described a meaning: enablement pays heed to denotational 
meaning, whereas claim construction fixes ideational meaning. Collins, Enabling, supra note 50, at 
1099–100. 
 153. Plant Genetic Sys., 315 F.3d at 1335.  
 154. Id. at 1338. 
 155. Id. at 1340. The transformed monocot cells were foreseeable after-arising technology, and 
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Medrad, Inc.,
156
 the Federal Circuit invalidated a claim to a method of 
using a ―high pressure power injector‖ for lack of enablement.157 The gap 
embodiments were power injectors without pressure jackets, and they 
were undeniably known concepts at the time the claim was filed because 
the originally filed claims contained a pressure-jacket limitation that was 
removed during prosecution.
158
 The enablement problem was thus not that 
the PHOSITA could not imagine or conceptualize the gap embodiments 
on the date of filing. Rather, the enablement problem was that, having 
readily imagined the gap embodiments, the PHOSITA did not know how 
to make them without undue experimentation.
159
 
Inversely, if the gap technologies are after-arising in the stronger sense 
that they are unknown concepts to the PHOSITA on the date of filing, then 
enablement challenges routinely fail.
160
 In this situation, enablement‘s 
temporally rooted PHOSITA cannot identify the unenabled, gap 
technologies, so he cannot marshal the evidence required to prove a lack 
of enablement. The classic case involving unknown-concept gap 
embodiments is In re Hogan.
161
 In Hogan, a patent applicant claimed ―a 
normally solid homopolymer‖ of a specified subunit.162 The specification 
taught the PHOSITA how to make a normally solid homopolymer that had 
a low molecular weight and that was crystalline in nature. On a later date, 
another inventor made a normally solid homopolymer that had a high 
molecular weight and that was amorphous in nature.
163
 The amorphous 
homopolymer was a gap embodiment: it was not enabled as a factual 
 
 
thus known concepts on the date of filing, because the distinction between monocots and dicots was 
well known in the art and the value of transformed monocots had been recognized. Id. at 1338. 
 156. 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 157. Id. at 1373. 
 158. Id. at 1374. Additionally, the specification explicitly discussed the difficulties of power 
injectors without pressure jackets. Id. at 1379–80. For another case in which the specification 
demonstrated that the gap embodiments in an enablement analysis were known concepts on the date of 
filing because it taught away from those embodiments, see AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234 
(Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 159. Another common scenario in which enablement challenges are successful involves claims 
that recite a large or open-ended range and specifications that teach how to make embodiments 
satisfying only a small portion of the claimed range. See, e.g., MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage 
Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A. 1970). Here, again, 
the gap embodiments are known concepts on the date of filing. If a claim describes a purity range from 
one to ten (of some arbitrary unit), then a compound with purity of nine is a known concept even if 
there is no embodiment with a purity of nine that is enabled by the specification. 
 160. But see infra text accompanying notes 175–79 (noting that the enablement doctrine can 
restrict the scope of functional claims by becoming a manifestation of the invention-structure 
equation).  
 161. 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A. 1977).  
 162. Id. at 597.  
 163. Id. at 601.  
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matter by the specification, but it was within the scope of the claim.
164
 
However, the court exempted the gap embodiment from enablement‘s 
commensurability analysis because it was a ―later state of the art,‖ i.e., it 
was an unknown concept on the date the patent was filed.
165
 At the time of 
filing, the claim language ―had a meaning to one skilled in the art that was 
coextensive with the species,‖ suggesting that the PHOSITA could not 
imagine or conceptualize the amorphous homopolymer.
166
 The concept of 
a high molecular weight, amorphous homopolymer of the specified 
subunit was not a within the grasp of the PHOSITA on the date the claim 
was filed, so the PHOSITA could not mount a successful invalidity 
argument that sounded in enablement.
167
  
At first glance, enablement‘s blind spot may seem odd as a policy 
matter in that it paradoxically invalidates claims that encompass less 
radical improvements and upholds claims that encompass more radical 
improvements.
168
 However, to the contrary, enablement‘s blind spot in fact 
serves an important policy function: the blind spot places an obligation on 
a patent applicant to draft narrower claims and avoid claim overbreadth 
only when the applicant can reasonably be held to be aware of the 
overbreadth at the time of filing and thus to have the capacity to draft 
narrower claims.
169
 When claims encompass gap embodiments that were 
known concepts on the date of filing, the patent drafter should have known 
the claims were overbroad, and he should have drafted narrower claims 
excluding the gap embodiments.
170
 Thus, when claims are held invalid for 
 
 
 164. The Hogan concurrence argued that the claim was not broad enough to encompass the 
amorphous homopolymer. Id. at 609–11 (Miller, J., concurring). However, the patent that the PTO 
eventually issued was, after litigation, found to be broad enough to encompass after-arising 
homopolymers. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
Furthermore, it would be poor policy to categorically exclude later-developed technology from earlier-
issued claims. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.  
 165. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 605–07; see also Plant Genetic Sys. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 
1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (―In Hogan, amorphous propylene, on the record before the court, was not 
known . . . when the application was filed.‖). 
 166. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 610 (Miller, J., concurring).  
 167. For a more recent application of Hogan in a case involving a gap embodiment that was an 
unknown concept on the date of filing, see Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 
2004).  
 168. Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2005); Ellen P. 
Winner, Enablement in Rapidly Developing Arts—Biotechnology, 70 J. PAT & TRADEMARK OFF. 
SOC‘Y 608, 624 (1988). The paradox assumes that the process of thinking up a previously unknown 
concept is a more radical advance over the prior art than the enablement of a known concept, but this 
assumption is not always a good one. 
 169. Collins, Enabling, supra note 50, at 1102–03.  
 170. The eventual invalidation during litigation of an overbroad claim that encompasses known-
concept after-arising technology should therefore leave an inventor with narrower protection for the 
technology he actually did invent. Patents are conventionally drafted with a series of telescoping 
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lack of enablement because they encompass foreseeable gap embodiments, 
the patentee‘s ―difficulty in enabling the . . . claims is a problem of its own 
making.‖171 In contrast, when claims encompass gap embodiments that 
were not known concepts on the date of filing, there is no reason to 
suspect that the patent drafter knew that the claims were overbroad. 
Without access to the requisite concepts, the patent applicant cannot be 
expected to draft narrower claims that exclude the gap embodiments.
172
 
Here, the difficulty in enabling the claims is not of the patentee‘s own 
making. Because the patent applicant could not be expected to have filed a 
narrower claim, a claim that encompasses after-arising technology that is 
an unknown concept on the date of filing should not be invalidated for 
lack of enablement.  
Once enablement‘s blind spot is recognized, it is easy to see why 
enablement is an ineffective curb on the overbreadth of functional claims. 
Functional claims are problematic because the type of overbreadth at issue 
is precisely the type that falls within enablement‘s blind spot: the gap 
technologies are unknown concepts. Consider again the claim in Wyeth v. 
Stone to a means of cutting ice other than by human power.
173
 This is a 
clear example of an overbroad, functional claim. Yet, at the time of filing, 
the PHOSITA likely could not imagine or conceive any particular gap 
embodiment; the PHOSITA could not describe an unenabled means of 
achieving the claimed functional goal.
174
 Thus, while the PHOSITA may 
strongly suspect that means of cutting ice other than the one disclosed in 
 
 
claims at nested levels of generality. If the broader claims are invalidated, the narrower claims still 
give an inventor some patent protection. When after-arising technology is a known concept on the date 
of filing, the patent drafter was perfectly capable of drafting the narrower claims excluding the after-
arising technology and encompassing only the technology that the inventor actually did invent. 
 171. MagSil Corp. v. Hitachi Global Storage Techs., Inc., 687 F.3d 1377, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 172. Courts sometimes justify enablement‘s blind spot by discussing what information a 
reasonable applicant can be expected to disclose rather than by focusing on what claims a reasonable 
applicant can draft. ―The law does not expect an applicant to disclose knowledge invented or 
developed after the filing date. Such disclosure would be impossible.‖ Chiron, 363 F.3d at 1254. A 
focus on what an applicant is capable of disclosing misses the point because it cannot differentiate 
between Hogan and Plant Genetic Systems. In cases in which the after-arising technology is 
specifically desired but difficult to obtain at the time of filing, it is impossible to disclose the after-
arising technology at the time of filing, but a claim that encompasses the after-arising technology 
should be invalid under the enablement doctrine. It is in part because an enabling disclosure is 
impossible at the time of filing that the Plant Genetics Systems claim should not be upheld. 
 173. See supra text accompanying notes 104–05. 
 174. Conception is wound up with understanding the structural properties of an invention: 
―Conception requires . . . the idea of the structure of the chemical compound.‖ Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 
F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1988). It is for this reason that the claims that fail the written description 
requirement are also often claims that had not yet been conceived on the date of filing. Fiers v. Revel, 
984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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the specification would eventually be developed, the PHOSITA cannot 
marshal the evidence needed to prove the overbreadth on the date of filing. 
Despite the difficulties of proving the overbreadth of a functional claim 
under the enablement doctrine, courts do use enablement to invalidate 
functional claims from time to time. To reach this result, however, the 
courts must selectively bracket Hogan, ignore enablement‘s blind spot, 
and transform enablement into yet one more vehicle for administering the 
invention-structure equation. For example, consider the Federal Circuit‘s 
enablement holding in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.
175
 
Amgen involved a functional claim to a set of DNA molecules: all DNA 
molecules with sequences that encode for polypeptides that are sufficiently 
duplicative of erythropoietin (EPO) to have the behavioral capacity of 
increasing the production of red blood cells.
176
 The specification disclosed 
a DNA molecule with a sequence that encoded for EPO itself, but it gave 
no indication of the portion of that sequence (or the portion of the 
polypeptide that constitutes EPO) that needed to be conserved for the 
DNA molecule to possess the claimed function.
177
 The Federal Circuit 
invalidated the claim for lack of commensurability under the enablement 
doctrine because ―[t]here may be many other genetic sequences‖ beyond 
those disclosed ―that code for EPO-type products,‖ i.e., that possess the 
claimed functional property.
178
 The Federal Circuit did not yet know even 
on the date of writing an opinion in an infringement case if there was 
another, non-disclosed genetic sequence that possessed the claimed 
functional property, but it invalidated the claim for lack of enablement 
nonetheless. The reason for the invalidation is clear: the claim failed to 
recite a sufficient quantum of structural properties as limitations. 
Enablement may thus in exceptional cases be employed as a policy lever 
that allows courts to invalidate functional claims. But, when it is used in 
this manner, enablement is indistinguishable from written description. It 
becomes yet one more doctrinal manifestation of the invention-structure 
equation.
179
 
 
 
 175. 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Amgen was decided before the advent of the modern written 
description requirement, so it might be expressly framed as a written description case today. 
 176. Id. at 1204. 
 177. Id. at 1212–14. 
 178. Id. at 1213 (emphasis added). 
 179. Thus, for the Federal Circuit to use enablement to curb the reach of functional claims in the 
software arts, it must identify the metaphorical structure of a software invention—the same task that it 
must undertake to bring the invention-structure equation to bear on software claims. The merger of 
enablement and the invention-structure equation in software claims surfaced in LizardTech, Inc. v. 
Earth Resource Mapping, Inc. when the Federal Circuit used the invention-structure equation to 
invalidate a software claim under both enablement and written description. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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III. EXPLAINING SOFTWARE-PATENT OVERBREADTH 
This Part identifies the root cause of the problem of software-patent 
overbreadth. Part III.A argues that software is a purely functional 
technology in the sense that the structural properties of the software 
actually generated by an inventor should not define a protectable software 
invention. Part III.B identifies patent law‘s functionality malfunction: the 
invention-structure equation breaks down when it is brought to bear on 
technologies, like software, that are purely functional.  
A. Software Inventions Are Functional All the Way Down 
Software is commonly described as exceptional or different from other 
patentable inventions, and one of the factual premises frequently put 
forward to justify software exceptionalism is that software is 
―intangible.‖180 Early courts questioning the patentability of software 
inventions analogized software to the supposedly intangible mental 
processes that occur within human minds,
181
 and the Freeman-Walter-
Abele test for patentable subject matter labeled software-executed 
processes as non-physical.
182
 More recently, the Federal Circuit used the 
assumption that software is intangible to question the patentability of 
software inventions under the machine-or-transformation test.
183
  
However, the embodiments of software programs that are capable of 
infringing software patents are clearly material, worldly entities.
184
 
 
 
 180. See, e.g., Richard S. Gruner, Intangible Inventions: Patentable Subject Matter for an 
Information Age, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 355, 357 (2002) (―New designs for software and computer-
based business practices . . . . resemble the sorts of intangible ideas and thought processes that have 
traditionally fallen outside of patent protections.‖).  
 181. See, e.g., In re Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969). The analogy between computer and 
mental processes has reemerged in the Federal Circuit‘s recent cases addressing the conditions under 
which software claims constitute patentable subject matter. See, e.g., Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life 
Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1277–79 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 182. See, e.g., In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835 (Fed. Cir. 1989).  
 183. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008), aff’d on other grounds sub nom Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). Software is also a human-readable text. See Arti Rai & James 
Boyle, Synthetic Biology: Caught Between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons, 5 
PLOS BIOLOGY 58 (2007) (describing software as ―a machine made of words‖). Human-readable texts, 
in turn, are commonly described as intangible entities because the knowledge that such texts convey 
has its principal locus in the human mind. See generally Kevin Emerson Collins, Semiotics 101: 
Taking the Printed Matter Doctrine Seriously, 85 IND. L.J. 1379 (2010) (casting the printed matter 
doctrine as a prohibition on the patenting of the human mind). 
 184. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007) (discussing the physicality of a 
copy of a software program in the course of assessing whether software can be a ―component‖ under 
§ 271(f)); Robert Plotkin, Computer Programming and the Automation of Invention: A Case for 
Software Patent Reform, 7 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 8–12 (2003). The definition of what constitutes a 
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Software does not violate the materialist worldview: it is the physical 
structure of software loaded onto a computer that endows software with its 
behavioral capacities.
185
 Software exists as electrons or charges on a hard 
drive or in a computer‘s memory; a computer implements a software 
program only because a particular set of gates in the processor is open or 
closed.
186
 While likely intended metaphorically, the statement that 
―[p]rogram text is, thus, like steel and plastic, a medium in which other 
works can be created‖ is literally true in that an operable embodiment of a 
software program exists only because it is crafted from a tangible 
medium.
187
  
Yet, despite the materiality of embodiments of software inventions, 
there is a grain of truth buried in the assertion that software is intangible in 
a way that makes software anomalous among patentable subject matters. 
Software programs may not lack materiality, but their materiality is 
irrelevant to identifying, delineating, or defining protectable software 
inventions. Assume a computer programmer has just invented a new 
software program. How can the inventor describe or define what he has 
invented? The programmer would be hard pressed to convey the gist of 
what he had invented by referring to any of the physical, structural 
properties of the software.  
[F]or all practical purposes the programmer and others who think 
about and describe the program have no practical choice but to 
conceive of and describe it in terms of its logical structure [or 
function]. . . . It is far from clear that it would even be possible for 
the human mind to appreciate the physical structure of all but the 
simplest programs or to explain them in terms of their physical 
structures.
188
  
 
 
software invention is an intangible conceptual type. Cf. Microsoft, 500 U.S. at 447–52 (discussing 
software ―in the abstract‖). However, the definitions of inventions in all technologies are conceptual 
types, so this does not make software exceptional. 
 185. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing materialism). 
 186. Plotkin, supra note 184, at 38–39. In fact, patent law has unflinchingly recognized the 
tangibility of software embodiments in some of its doctrines even as it has denied the tangibility of 
software in others. For example, a computer programmed with a new software program has long been 
treated as a new machine under the novelty doctrine. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int‘l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 
1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc); In re 
Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1247 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1403 n.29 (C.C.P.A. 
1969). 
 187. Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer 
Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2323 (1994).  
 188. Plotkin, supra note 184, at 46 & n.126; see also id. at 26 (―The process of computer 
programming enables a programmer to create a machine that has a particular novel physical structure 
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The irrelevance of the physical, structural properties of a software 
embodiment to the definition of a software program has been engineered 
into the very nature of software itself at the most fundamental of levels. 
The core value of software lies in the fact that the design of software that 
possesses any given set of logical, functional properties need not involve 
any consideration of the physical properties of the hardware or the 
distribution of electrical charges therein: ―Computers are understandable 
because you can focus on what is happening at one [functional] level of 
the hierarchy without worrying about the details of what goes on at the 
lower [structural] levels.‖189 A software program can be implemented in 
entirely different code in the same programming language or in an entirely 
different language,
190
 and there is no common thread of physical, 
structural properties that runs through these distinct codings. Thanks to 
interpreters and compilers, any given program can be implemented on a 
wide array of different computers, each possessing a different internal 
architecture and requiring the software to take on different physical, 
structural properties.
191
 In fact, ―[p]resent-day computers‖ on which 
software programs are executed ―are built of transistors and wires, but they 
could just as well be built, according to the same principles, from valves 
and water pipes, or from sticks and strings.‖192 Furthermore, hardware and 
software implementations of any given program are functionally 
interchangeable despite their radically different structural properties.
193
  
The behavioral capacities of a computer program—that is, ―the actions 
that a computer can perform by executing program instructions‖—are 
central to the definition of a computer program.
194
 Standing alone, 
however, the importance of the functional properties does not differentiate 
 
 
for performing a particular function without requiring the programmer to design the novel features of 
the machine in physical terms.‖); id. at 36 (―[O]ne of computer science‘s express goals is to ensure that 
programmers can do their work in complete ignorance of the physical structure of . . . hardware . . . .‖); 
id. at 44–45 (―[A] programmer who modifies the physical structure of a computer by providing source 
code to the computer need not even know that the computer‘s memory is being physically modified at 
all, much less understand or appreciate the nature of those physical modifications.‖) (citations 
omitted). 
 189. See W. DANIEL HILLIS, THE PATTERN ON THE STONE, at ix (1998).  
 190. Samuelson et al., supra note 187, at 2317.  
 191. HILLIS, supra note 189, at 56–58 (discussing interpreters and compilers); cf. Microsoft Corp. 
v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 450 (2007) (―Software . . . is a stand-alone product developed and 
marketed ‗for use on many different types of computer hardware . . . .‘‖). 
 192. HILLIS, supra note 189, at viii. Software programs running on after-arising hardware always 
infringe earlier-filed software patents precisely because the radically new structure that the software 
must take on to run on the after-arising hardware is irrelevant to the definition of what constitutes a 
software invention. Collins, Getting into the “Spirit,” supra note 44, at 1265–67. 
 193. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Rader, J., concurring).  
 194. Samuelson et al., supra note 187, at 2316–20. 
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software from other patentable technologies. A pharmaceutical drug is 
valued by a consumer more directly for what it does (cure a disease) than 
for its molecular structure; a patient cares that a drug has a particular 
molecular structure only because that structure has a metabolic function.
195
 
What is unique about software is not the significance of functionality per 
se but rather the insignificance of physical structure: it is practically 
impossible to refer to a set of structural characteristics shared by the 
embodiments of a software invention.
196
 It is for this reason that 
―[b]ehavior is not a secondary by-product of a program, but rather an 
essential part of what programs are.‖197 
In short, software is exceptional. The key to software exceptionalism 
lies in a weak form of the software-is-intangible argument. Although they 
exist, the physical, material properties of an embodiment of a software 
invention are not relevant to what constitutes a protectable software 
invention or thus to the optimal scope of a software claim. Viewed from 
the opposite perspective, software is a purely functional technology on all 
relevant levels of definition.
198
 The ontology of invention is thus reversed 
in the software arts. In most arts, an invention ―is‖ its structure, not its 
function.
199
 In the software arts, however, an invention ―is‖ its function, 
not its structure. A software invention is function ―all the way down.‖200 
B. The Functionality Malfunction 
There is a fundamental mismatch between the invention-structure 
equation that patent law has traditionally employed to curtail the scope of 
functional claims and the purely functional nature of software inventions. 
The invention-structure equation enables courts to rein in the overbreadth 
of functional claims. Because protectable inventions are defined by some 
subset of the structural properties of the technology that an inventor has 
 
 
 195. See supra text accompanying note 71–72 (noting the importance of functional properties in 
market definition). 
 196. Unique may be an overstatement. See supra note 13.  
 197. Samuelson et al., supra note 187, at 2317. 
 198. A recent commentator arrives at a similar conclusion about the exceptional, functional nature 
of software inventions. Note, Everlasting Software, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1456 (2012) 
(―[S]oftware . . . is defined . . . by function itself.‖). However, the explanation for the functional nature 
of software is not that ―software does not have physical characteristics.‖ Id. Rather, the explanation is 
that software as a technology has been engineered at a deep level to make the physical, structural 
characteristics of software irrelevant to the definition of a software program. See supra text 
accompanying notes 188–93.  
 199. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.  
 200. HAWKING, supra note 4, at 1.  
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generated, purely functional claims are overbroad and invalid.
201
 Software 
inventions, however, are purely functional entities. The material, structural 
properties of a software program are not relevant to the definition of a 
protectable software invention or the optimal scope of a software claim.
202
 
Software inventions therefore lack the metaphorical bolt onto which patent 
law‘s conventional scope-restraining doctrinal tools (or ―policy levers‖
203
) 
can attach to gain purchase and curtail permissible claim scope in a 
systematic manner. This is patent law‘s functionality malfunction: the 
patent doctrines that have traditionally curtailed claim overbreadth break 
down when they are brought to bear on purely functional technologies. 
The invention-structure equation simply cannot get a grip on the problem 
of the overbreadth of functional claims in the software arts as there are no 
relevant physical, structural properties to grab onto and require as claim 
limitations. 
The functionality malfunction places judges and examiners between a 
rock (too little protection) and a hard place (too much protection) in the 
software arts. Enforcing the invention-structure equation by requiring the 
recitation of physical, structural properties as claim limitations would 
yield absurdly narrow, economically irrelevant claims. Unclaimed, perfect 
economic substitutes would abound,
204
 and the private value of a software 
patent to its owner would most likely not be worth the private cost of 
obtaining the patent. Software patents would wither on the vine. 
Alternatively, if the courts were to exempt software from the invention-
structure equation and sanction purely functional software claims, then the 
very functional claims that are deemed to be overbroad and invalidated in 
other arts would be an expected feature of software patents.
205
 As early 
commentators on the patentability of software inventions noted,  
[I]f the Patent and Trademark Office were willing to issue a patent 
with claims for any means of achieving a particular set of results, 
such a patent would issue at a high level of generality and would 
inhibit competition in development of useful program behaviors out 
 
 
 201. See supra Part II.C. 
 202. See supra Part III.A. 
 203. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 109–65. 
 204. See supra notes 64–70 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between claim 
scope and market power). 
 205. See supra Parts II.B & C.  
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of proportion to the innovation actually contributed by the 
claimant.
206
  
Confronted with this choice between patent protection that is either too 
hard or too soft, the courts have clearly chosen too soft. Inventors 
routinely seek, and courts routinely sanction, purely functional software 
claims. For an anecdotal illustration of the purely functional nature of 
most contemporary software claims, consider claim 22 of patent number 
5,231,670.
207
 Claim 22 describes a voice-recognition technology that 
allows a user to create a text file by uttering both the words that are the 
substance of the text (―spoken input‖) and commands that trigger 
functional responses from the software that one could otherwise trigger by 
using pull-down menus or keyboard shortcuts (―spoken commands‖).208 In 
its entirety, claim 22 reads: 
22. A method for editing displayed textual data generated in 
response to an audio input signal representing spoken input text, 
said method comprising the steps of:  
 editing said generated textual data by  
receiving audio signals representing spoken input textual data 
and spoken commands through an input device;  
analyzing said audio signals to determine whether said audio 
signals represent spoken input to be provided to an 
application or a spoken command for editing textual data.
209
 
This language delineates the outer boundary of a software claim by 
reciting two behaviors—the receiving and analyzing steps—that allow the 
software to perform the function of editing textual data. This type of 
functional claim would routinely be invalidated for overbreadth in other 
 
 
 206. Samuelson et al., supra note 187, at 2345. 
 207. U.S. Patent No. 5,231,670 (filed Mar. 19, 1992). This claim is used as an example because it 
is both simple to explain and representative of software patents broadly writ, not because it is unusual 
or well known. For an example of a high-profile, litigated functional software claim, consider 
Amazon‘s infamous patent on a one-click method of checking out during an internet retail transaction. 
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Lemley, 
supra note 1, at 16–18 (listing examples of functional claim limitations in litigated software cases). 
 208. ‘670 Patent, col. 2 ll. 50–55 (―[T]he system and method . . . process both simple spoken 
words as well as spoken commands and . . . provide the necessary text generation in response to the 
spoken words or . . . execute an appropriate function in response to a command.‖). 
 209. Id. at col. 16 ll. 18–27.  
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arts, but the functionality malfunction has made it the norm in the software 
arts.
210
 
The functionality malfunction, and thus the problem of software-patent 
overbreadth, results from a clash between the legal importance of the 
structural properties of an invention in patent doctrine and the 
technological irrelevance of those properties in the software arts. The 
problem is not simply that courts have failed to bring readily available 
policy levers to bear on these claims in the economically appropriate 
manner.
211
 Rather, the problem is that the exceptional nature of software 
as a technology neutralizes the policy lever that is conventionally used to 
adjust the permissible scope of functional claims. 
IV. ALGORITHMS: A VIABLE SOFTWARE-SPECIFIC PATCH?  
The functionality malfunction in the software arts explains why the 
traditional policy lever for curtailing the scope of functional claims, 
namely the invention-structure equation, has not to date been widely used 
in the software arts. Yet the inefficacy of the traditional doctrinal tool need 
not in and of itself doom software patents to a fate of anomalous 
overbreadth. A sui generis, software-specific patch for the functionality 
malfunction could bring the scope of software patents into line with the 
scope of patents in other technological arts. This Part considers the most 
promising of such patches: the adoption of an invention-algorithm 
equation to curtail the scope of functional claims in the software arts. Part 
IV.A defines an algorithm as the term is used in computer science. It 
argues that an invention-algorithm equation offers a technology-specific 
way of bringing the invention-structure equation to bear on functional 
claims in the software arts. Part IV.B demonstrates that the Federal Circuit 
has already taken the first, tentative steps toward recognizing algorithms 
as the metaphorical structures of software inventions in all three of the 
doctrines that employ the invention-structure equation. Part IV.C sounds 
three notes of caution about the difficulties that the Federal Circuit will 
 
 
 210. James Bessen and Michael Meurer argue that the principal effect of the functional nature of 
software claims may not be claim overbreadth. They argue that it may instead be uncertainty 
concerning validity if courts act in an expedient, ad hoc manner to narrow or invalidate overbroad 
software claims. BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 1, at 211–12; cf. Request for Comments and Notice 
of Roundtable Events for Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related Patents, 78 Fed. 
Reg. 292, 294 (Jan. 3, 2013) (framing the principal problem created by functional software claims as a 
problem of indefiniteness and uncertainty). Even if Bessen and Meurer are correct, the functionality 
malfunction remains the root cause of the costly problem that plagues software patents, but the 
problem is uncertainty about claim validity rather than overbreadth. 
 211. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
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have to address if the invention-algorithm equation is to be developed into 
a tool that can curtail the scope of functional software claims in a rigorous, 
systematic manner.  
A. The Invention-Algorithm Equation 
In computer science, an algorithm is defined as a ―systematic and 
precise, step-by-step procedure . . . for solving certain kinds of problems 
or accomplishing a task.‖212 Simply put, ―the essence of algorithms‖ is 
―what to do to perform a task.‖213 This is an extremely flexible 
definition.
214
 All that is needed is, first, for a problem or task to be 
identified and, second, for a step-by-step procedure for solving the 
problem or accomplishing the task to be specified. There is no single 
format in which an algorithm must be communicated. Mathematical 
formulae, prose, and flow charts can all express algorithms.
215
  
Although the invention-structure equation curbs permissible claim 
scope and invalidates purely functional claims in most arts,
216
 it cannot 
curtail functional claiming in the software arts because there are no 
physical, structural properties that contribute to the identity of a software 
invention.
217
 However, courts could port the invention-structure equation 
over to the software arts by framing algorithms as the metaphorical 
structures of software inventions and adopting a technology-specific 
invention-algorithm equation.  
Just as the invention-structure equation grounds the identity of the 
protectable invention in a subset of the structural properties of the 
technology that an inventor actually produces and discloses, the invention-
algorithm equation defines a protectable software invention with reference 
to some of the algorithmic properties of the software that an inventor 
 
 
 212. DICTIONARY OF COMPUTER SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY 13 (Phillip A. 
Laplante ed., 2000); see also MICROSOFT COMPUTER DICTIONARY (5th ed. 2002) (―a finite sequence 
of steps for solving a logical or mathematical problem or performing a task‖); LESLEY ANNE 
ROBERTSON ET AL., SIMPLE PROGRAM DESIGN: A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH 271 (3d ed. 2000) 
(―[Algorithms are a] set of detailed, unambiguous and ordered instructions developed to describe the 
processes necessary to produce the desired output from given input.‖); Allen Newell, Response: The 
Models Are Broken, The Models Are Broken, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1023, 1024 (1986) (―An algorithm is 
[a] . . . sequence of steps or operations for solving a class of problems.‖). The computer scientist‘s 
definition of an algorithm is likely more general than the definition that the Supreme Court employed 
in its software cases. See infra Part IV.C.3.  
 213. Newell, supra note 212, at 1026. 
 214. In fact, its flexibility may be its downfall as a tool for patent law. See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 215. Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 216. See supra Part II.C.  
 217. See supra Part III.A.  
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actually produces and discloses. Each functional limitation in a software 
claim states a problem that needs to be solved or a task that needs to be 
performed. Any step-by-step procedure that leads to the solution of the 
problem or the accomplishment of the task is an algorithm. For example, 
consider again claim 22 of the ‘670 patent.218 This claim recites two 
functional limitations: the ―receiving‖ limitation and the ―analyzing‖ 
limitation. Each of these limitations specifies a task to be accomplished or, 
if you are a software engineer who is instructed to write code that can 
perform these tasks, a problem to be solved. An algorithm—whether in the 
form of a flow chart or a textual description—lists a series of more 
specific steps that, if performed in the proper sequence, accomplishes the 
more general task that is recited as the claim limitation. The invention-
algorithm equation would invalidate claims like claim 22 under the 
commensurability principle.
219
 Claim 22 encompasses all software 
programs that accomplish the claimed tasks of receiving and analyzing. 
However, under the invention-algorithm equation, the inventor‘s 
protectable invention is only a set of algorithms for performing the tasks 
of receiving and analyzing, rendering claim 22 impermissibly overbroad 
for the same reason that purely functional claims are overbroad in other 
arts. The invention-algorithm equation upholds the validity of functional 
software claims only if those claims are limited in scope to particular 
algorithms for accomplishing the claimed functions.
220
 
In most arts, the physical, structural properties of the technology that 
an inventor has produced are the answer to ―how‖ question of technology: 
How does a technology work, or how does it achieve the functional utility 
that it possesses?
221
 In the software arts, a computer scientist would 
answer this same ―how‖ question not by reciting the physical, structural 
properties of an embodiment of software but rather by stating an 
algorithm. Algorithms are still functional entities in that they, too, are 
composed of functionally defined steps.
222
 Yet, because algorithms 
describe a more specific set of functions for achieving the more general 
function recited as a claim limitation, courts can frame them as the 
 
 
 218. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
 219. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (discussing the commensurability principle). 
 220. The invention-algorithm equation could employ either of the two mechanisms through which 
the invention-structure equation already operates. It could invalidate overbroad claims, or it could 
construe them narrowly. See supra note 101.  
 221. See supra text accompanying notes 32–33. 
 222. Functional software claims are unavoidable given that software is function all the way down. 
See supra Part III.A. 
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metaphorical structure of a software invention,
223
 and courts can use them 
to curtail the scope of functional claims.
224
Additionally, algorithms 
possess the same many-to-one relationship to functions that physical 
structures have to functions in other technologies.
225
 There are many 
different physical designs for mousetraps that can catch mice, and a 
variety of different molecular structures for drugs that can lower 
cholesterol. Similarly, there is usually an array of algorithms for achieving 
any given functionally specified task. The many-to-one relationship 
between algorithms and functionally specified tasks means that later 
software inventors can aspire to invent-around earlier software claims that 
are limited by the invention-algorithm equation, just as later inventors in 
other arts can aspire to invent-around claims that are limited in scope by 
the invention-structure equation.
226
 Other answers to the ―how‖ question 
often remain available for later innovators to discover, invent, and 
commercialize without running afoul of the earlier inventor‘s rights. 
In sum, algorithms can be the software analog for the physical, 
structural properties that define a protectable invention in other arts. They 
give the invention-structure equation something to latch onto in the purely 
functional realm of software. When incorporated into the invention-
algorithm equation, they offer one route forward for remedying patent 
law‘s functionality malfunction in the software arts, resolving the problem 
of software-patent overbreadth that it has generated and bringing the scope 
of software patents into line with the scope of patents in other 
technologies. 
One potential objection to the invention-algorithm equation as a 
mechanism for curtailing claim scope in the software arts is that software 
inventors deserve anomalously broad, functional claims because a 
software inventor‘s ―actual invention is functionality‖ whereas other 
inventors‘ actual inventions are only structurally defined means of 
achieving that functionality.
227
 However, this distinction does not justify 
the issuance of anomalously broad claims in the software arts. It is true 
that a software inventor who thinks up a new behavior for a software 
program makes a different kind of contribution to technological progress 
than the inventor of the first drug that has the long-desired behavior of 
 
 
 223. They are ―logical structure‖ rather than physical structure. Plotkin, supra note 184, at 26–29. 
 224. But see infra Part IV.C.2 (discussing the difficulties that the functional nature of an algorithm 
creates for the invention-algorithm equation).  
 225. See supra text accompanying note 34.  
 226. See supra text accompanying note 76.  
 227. Everlasting Software, supra note 198, at 1474. 
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being able to cure a well-known medical condition does.
228
 However, 
inventors in the non-software arts do sometimes think up or imagine the 
functional properties that they employ to limit claim scope, and there are 
sound policy reasons to explain why even these relatively more 
meritorious inventors cannot today obtain functional claims under the 
invention-structure equation.
229
  
B. The Federal Circuit’s Tentative, Uncoordinated Steps 
The idea of framing algorithms as the metaphorical structures of 
software inventions in order to curtail the permissible scope of functional 
software claims is not novel. As explored below in Part IV.B.1, the 
Federal Circuit has recently invalidated a significant number of software 
claims drafted in means-plus-function format because the specifications 
failed to disclose algorithms for performing the claimed functions.
230
 
However, what has escaped general notice is that the Federal Circuit has 
also repeatedly used the invention-algorithm equation to curtail the 
permissible scope of software patents in cases not involving means-plus-
function claims. In a tentative and uncoordinated manner, the Federal 
Circuit has employed the invention-algorithm equation through all three of 
the patent doctrines in which the invention-structure equation manifests 
itself in other arts.
231
 Part IV.B.2 considers the Federal Circuit‘s use of 
algorithms in the written description requirement, and Part IV.B.3 looks at 
algorithms in the doctrine of patentable subject matter. Superficially, the 
developments in these three doctrines may appear to be distinct, as the 
doctrine addressed in each section employs unrelated terminology and 
arises from different statutory provisions. Substantively, however, all three 
 
 
 228. See supra Part II.B.1.  
 229. See supra Parts II.B.2 & 3 (discussing the normative concerns about claims that map onto 
markets and the preservation of spillovers). Another possible objection to allowing the invention-
algorithm equation to curtail the scope of broad, functional claims in the software arts sounds in 
enablement. The objection is that ―[a]n inventor‘s description of one object for accomplishing a 
function in the real world does not enable . . . all objects that accomplish the function‖ whereas ―[o]nce 
the function [of a software invention] is disclosed‖ all software embodiments that perform the function 
are enabled. Everlasting Software, supra note 198, at 1462, 1464–65. This objection misses the mark 
because the disclosure of a desired behavior does not enable all means of achieving that behavior, 
either beyond or within the software arts. Later mechanical inventors will devise nonobvious structures 
that exhibit an earlier-identified behavior, and later software inventors will devise nonobvious 
algorithms, programming languages, and computer hardwares that exhibit an earlier-identified 
behavior. 
 230. These cases have already been addressed in patent commentary. See supra note 15. 
 231. See supra Part II.C (discussing the three distinct doctrinal manifestations of the invention-
structure equation).  
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demonstrate that the Federal Circuit has taken the first, tentative steps 
toward porting the invention-structure equation over to the software arts in 
the form of an invention-algorithm equation. Just as the unified nature of 
the invention-structure equation as a mechanism for curtailing permissible 
claim scope has to date remained a hidden principle of the deep structure 
of the patent regime,
232
 the wide-spread nature of the Federal Circuit‘s turn 
to algorithms in all three of the doctrines that employ the invention-
algorithm equation in software cases has also gone unnoticed. 
1. Algorithms as Corresponding Structures 
Section 112(f) states that claim limitations drafted in means-plus-
function format are to be construed in a narrow fashion.
233
 The limitations 
do not encompass all structures capable of achieving the claimed 
functions. Rather, they encompass only the corresponding structures for 
achieving those functions disclosed in the specification, as well as the 
equivalents of those corresponding structures.  
Software claims are commonly drafted in means-plus-function 
format,
234
 and the Federal Circuit has recently begun to invalidate means-
plus-function software claims for indefiniteness if the patent specification 
fails to disclose an algorithm for achieving the claimed function.
235
 These 
cases are doctrinally complex, but the take-home lesson is simple. The 
Federal Circuit has adopted the invention-algorithm equation to limit 
permissible claim scope. It treats an algorithm as the metaphorical 
 
 
 232. See supra notes 97–101 and accompanying text. 
 233. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012); see also supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text (discussing 
means-plus-function limitations).  
 234. In fact, means-plus-function claims were the preferred style of claiming software for many 
years when the status of software inventions as patentable subject matter under section 101 had not yet 
been clearly established. See LEMLEY ET AL., SOFTWARE AND INTERNET LAW 217–19 (3d ed. 2006); 
Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2001). But cf. infra note 302 (noting a more recent decline in the use of ―means for‖ 
language in patent applications). 
 235. See Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google Inc., No. 2012-1020, 2013 WL 516366 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 
13, 2013); ePlus, Inc. v. Lawson Software, Inc., 700 F.3d 509 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Noah Sys., Inc., v. 
Intuit Inc., 675 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2012); HTC Corp. v. IPCom GmbH & Co., 667 F.3d 1270 (Fed. 
Cir. 2012); Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012); In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293 
(Fed. Cir. 2011); Rembrandt Data Techs. v. AOL, 641 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2011); In re Katz 
Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Brown v. Baylor Healthcare 
Sys., No. 2009-1530, 2010 WL 1838921 (Fed. Cir. May 7, 2010); Net MoneyIN, Inc. v. VeriSign, 
Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elecs., Inc., 
No. 2009-1087, 2009 WL 4458527 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 4, 2009); Blackboard, Inc. v. Desire2Learn Inc., 
574 F.3d 1371, 1383–85 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Finisar Corp. v. DirecTV Grp., Inc., 523 F.3d 1323 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008); Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Int‘l Game Tech., 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008); cf. 
Keithley v. Homestore.com, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 2d 978, 988–95 (N.D. Cal. 2008).  
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structure of a software invention in order to bring the invention-structure 
equation to bear on software claims.  
When the question of what constitutes the corresponding structure of a 
means-plus-function limitation in a software claim arose, patent owners 
sought a definition at an extremely high level of generality: a general-
purpose computer programmed with software—any software.236 If 
corresponding structure could be defined at this high level of generality, 
then purely functional software claims would be a de facto reality even for 
claims drafted in means-plus-function format. At the opposite extreme, if 
the corresponding structure were to be defined at the level of the physical, 
structural properties of a software embodiment, then software patents 
would be worthless as a practical matter.
237
 In WMS Gaming, Inc. v. 
International Game Technologies, the Federal Circuit eschewed these two 
extremes and settled on a middle ground: it identified algorithms as the 
corresponding structures for means-plus-function limitations in software 
claims.
238
 A means-plus-function limitation in a software claim can only 
encompass software programs that employ the algorithms for achieving 
the claimed function disclosed by the inventor in his patent specification, 
as well as equivalent algorithms. 
Means-plus-function limitations must be limited to the corresponding 
structure disclosed in the patent specification (and its equivalents), but 
what if the patent specification fails to disclose any structure that is 
capable of performing the claimed function? In this situation, the Federal 
Circuit holds that the means-plus-function claims are invalid for 
indefiniteness.
239
 The indefiniteness doctrine of section 112(b) holds that 
claims that employ limitations that have no discernible meaning are 
invalid.
240
 Indefiniteness is a common-sense rule. The scope of a claim to 
a ―thingamajig‖ cannot be ascertained, so there are many instances in 
which neither the validity nor infringement analyses can proceed. In the 
context of means-plus-function limitations, section 112(f) states that the 
meaning of the claim language is the corresponding structure in the 
disclosure and its equivalents. If there is no corresponding structure in the 
disclosure to be found, the means-plus-function limitation has no 
discernible meaning and is thus invalid for indefiniteness.
241
  
 
 
 236. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int‘l Game Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1347–50 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 237. See supra text accompanying note 204. 
 238. WMS Gaming, 184 F.3d at 1349; see also Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1253 
(Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 239. In re Donaldson Co., 16 F.3d 1189, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).  
 240. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).  
 241. Donaldson, 16 F.3d at 1195.  
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Despite the technical nature of the rejection as an indefiniteness 
rejection, it is important to recognize that the root of the problem when 
there is no corresponding structure remains overbreadth. There is nothing 
inherently unclear about a claim defined with functional language. For 
example, the rules of means-plus-function claiming aside, a claim to any 
device that uses electromagnetism to communicate intelligible characters 
at a distance is not like a claim to a thingamajig. In fact, as the Supreme 
Court flatly stated in O’Reilly v. Morse: ―It is impossible to misunderstand 
the extent of this claim.‖242 The functional language in Morse has a clearly 
discernible meaning: it describes, and thus encompasses, every means for 
performing the specified function. One can readily determine whether any 
particular machine falls within or beyond its scope. The indefiniteness 
problem arises only because of the statutorily specified rules of claim 
construction for means-plus-function limitations, and these rules, in turn, 
exist only because of the Supreme Court‘s cases from the early twentieth 
century that invalidate purely functional claims for overbreadth.
243
 Thus, it 
is misleading to say, as patent commentators often do, that ―[t]he purpose 
of section 112(f)—and thus the purpose of requiring an algorithm to 
support functional software claims—is to ensure ‗adequate defining 
structure to render the bounds of the claim understandable to one of 
ordinary skill in the art.‘‖244 The purpose of 112(f) is to reign in 
permissible claim scope, not to remedy some (nonexistent) indefiniteness 
problem that is inherent in all functional language.
245
 Indefiniteness 
 
 
 242. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 112 (1853).  
 243. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 244. Comments of Google Inc., In re Request for Comments and Notice of Roundtable Events for 
Partnership for Enhancement of Quality of Software-Related Patents, at *17 (Apr. 15, 2013), 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/comments/sw-e_google_20130415.pdf. 
 245. The functional nature of claim language does sometimes create an unusual indefiniteness 
problem. However, the root of the problem in these situations is not that the meaning of the claim 
language is unclear. Rather, the problem is that testing embodiments of a technology to determine 
whether they possess the claimed behavior is extremely laborious. For example, in Enzo Biochem, Inc. 
v. Applera Corp., 599 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010), the Federal Circuit considered, but rejected, a 
defendant‘s argument that a functional claim limitation was indefinite. The claim described a linkage 
group in a DNA strand that did not interfere substantially with the ability of the DNA strand to 
hybridize with other DNA strands. The defendant argued that the hybridization limitation was 
indefinite due to the need to test each and every combination of a linkage group and a strand to see if it 
meets the limitation: ―Because even a minor alteration of a single nucleotide may have profound 
effects on the ability of a DNA strand to hybridize, depending on the length and sequence of the 
strand, [the defendant] argues that identical linkage groups may cause interference in some strands but 
not in others . . . .‖ Id. at 1332. Consider also a claim to a drug-coated stent with the following 
functional limitation: ―‗wherein said [stent] provides an in-stent late loss in diameter at 12 months 
following implantation in a human of less than about 0.5 mm.‘‖ Bos. Scientific Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 647 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The meaning of the functional claim language is 
perfectly clear, but potential defendants cannot know whether a stent infringes the claim unless they 
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problems in 112(f) claims are second-order problems. They are artifacts of 
patent applicants‘ failure to provide the data needed to construe a 
functional claim narrowly according to the rules of 112(f). But for the 
need to rein in claim scope, functional claims would not have routine 
indefiniteness problems.  
In its 2008 opinion in Aristocrat Technologies Australia v. 
International Game Technology,
246
 the Federal Circuit invalidated a 
software claim drafted with a means-plus-function limitation for 
indefiniteness because there was no algorithm disclosed in the patent 
specification.
247
 Aristocrat Technologies involved a patent on ―an 
electronic slot machine that allows a player to select winning 
combinations of symbol positions.‖248 The patent claimed the electronic 
guts of the slot machine, with a limitation reciting a ―game control means‖ 
that performed the functions of controlling the images displayed to the 
player, paying a prize when the predetermined combination of symbols 
shows up, and defining the pay lines.
249
 The Federal Circuit held that the 
―game control means‖ limitation was a means-plus-function limitation and 
that the specification only described ―pictorial and mathematical ways of 
describing the claimed function of the game control means,‖ not an 
algorithm that specified a step-by-step procedure for accomplishing the 
claimed function.
250
 The court invalidated the claim ―to avoid pure 
functional claiming . . . ‗unbounded by any reference to structure in the 
specification.‘‖251  
 
 
implant the stent into a human, wait twelve months, and examine the device. In these situations, 
functional claims create a public notice problem that is not caused by a lack of clarity in the meaning 
of functional language. 
 246. 521 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 247. Id. at 1332–38. The intersection of indefiniteness and means-plus-function claims for 
software inventions had been raised in earlier cases, but the Federal Circuit had previously applied a 
lax standard and upheld software claims with means-plus-function limitations even when the 
disclosure did not specify an algorithm for performing the claimed function. See, e.g., In re Dossel, 
115 F.3d 942, 946 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (―While the written description does not disclose exactly what 
mathematical algorithm will be used to compute the end result, it does state that ‗known algorithms‘ 
can be used to solve standard equations which are known in the art.‖). 
 248. Aristocrat Techs., 521 F.3d at 1330. 
 249. Id. at 1331. 
 250. Id. at 1334–35; see also id. at 1334 (noting that an equation disclosed in the specification ―is 
not an algorithm that describes how the function is performed, but is merely a mathematical expression 
that describes the outcome of performing the function‖). The argument that the specification simply 
restates the claimed functions is common in the Federal Circuit‘s algorithm cases. See, e.g., 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Alpine Elecs., Inc., No. 2009-1087, 2009 WL 4458527, at * 5 (Fed. 
Cir. Dec. 4, 2009) (addressing a ―one-step algorithm‖ that ―is simply a recitation of the claimed 
function‖). 
 251. Aristocrat Techs., 521 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Med. Instrumentation & Diagnostics Corp. v. 
Elekta AB, 344 F.3d 1205, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2003)). 
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Aristocrat Technologies has led to a wave of cases in which the Federal 
Circuit has invalidated software claims drafted with means-plus-function 
limitations because the specification fails to disclose an algorithm.
252
 This 
is the invention-algorithm equation at work in the software arts, with 
algorithms framed as the metaphorical structure of software inventions. 
The inventor‘s protectable invention is a set of algorithms for achieving a 
specified function. Claims that reach beyond those algorithms violate the 
commensurability principle and are thus invalid for overbreadth. 
2. Algorithms as Possessed Inventions 
To date, the Federal Circuit has not considered many invalidity 
arguments based on the written description doctrine in the software arts.
253
 
However, the Federal Circuit‘s one high-profile software case that uses the 
written description requirement to curtail an overbroad claim—LizardTech 
Inc. v. Earth Resource Mapping, Inc.
254—clearly employs the invention-
algorithm equation. It frames algorithms as the metaphorical structures of 
software inventions and tethers permissible claim scope to the algorithms 
disclosed in the specification.  
LizardTech involved a patent on technology for compressing large 
digital images.
255
 The prior art broke the large image into discrete tiles and 
compressed the tiles individually, but this procedure resulted in seams or 
boundary effects in the image when the picture was displayed.
256
 The 
patented technology overcame this shortcoming and compressed the tiles 
of a large image in a manner that yielded a ―seamless‖ image.257 The 
Federal Circuit addressed two nested claims. The broader claim 
encompassed any method of compressing the tiles of a large image so as to 
create a seamless compression file, and the narrower claim described a 
method of achieving this end that involved ―maintaining updated sums.‖258 
 
 
 252. See supra note 235. Determining whether the specification discloses a step-by-step algorithm 
for performing the claimed function, or whether the specification repeats the functions already listed as 
claim limitations, has proven difficult. Compare In re Aoyama, 656 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (no 
algorithm disclosed), with Typhoon Touch Techs., Inc. v. Dell, Inc., 659 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(algorithm disclosed). 
 253. Most written description arguments have involved the biochemical arts. See supra note 128. 
 254. 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Int‘l Automated Sys., Inc. v. Digital Persona, Inc., 
565 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (D. Utah 2008) (applying LizardTech to a software invention). 
 255. For a detailed discussion of the technology and claims at issue in LizardTech, see Merges, 
supra note 144, at 1657–72. 
 256. LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1339. 
 257. Id.  
 258. Id. at 1340. 
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The allegedly infringing software technology did not maintain updated 
sums, so it infringed the broader claim, but not the narrower claim.
259
 
The plaintiff‘s victory on infringement of the broader claim, however, 
was Pyrrhic as the Federal Circuit invalidated that claim under the written 
description doctrine. The Federal Circuit held that the specification 
disclosed a particular algorithm for performing the compression process 
that included the step of maintaining updated sums, and it invalidated the 
broad claim because it was not limited to methods employing that 
algorithm.
260
 In other words, ―a specific algorithm was recited in the patent 
specification [but] the asserted claim had been broadened (by dropping a 
limiting feature present in the algorithm described in the specification)‖ 
and was therefore invalid for overbreadth.
261
 Just as the functional claims 
in Eli Lilly were too broad because they reached too far beyond the 
structure of the DNA molecules disclosed in the specification,
262
 the 
functional claims in LizardTech were too broad because they reached too 
far beyond the algorithm for achieving the claimed function disclosed in 
the specification. This, again, is the invention-algorithm equation at work 
in the software arts, with an algorithm identified as the metaphorical 
structure of a software invention.  
3. Algorithms as Indicators of Particular Machines 
In its 2010 opinion in Bilski v. Kappos,
263
 the Supreme Court 
reaffirmed that claims to abstract ideas do not describe patentable subject 
matter under section 101. In Bilski‘s aftermath, the Federal Circuit has 
been grappling with the difficult task of distinguishing unpatentable 
software claims that describe abstract ideas from patentable software 
claims that do not.
264
 One theme in these post-Bilski software cases is that 
 
 
 259. Id. at 1340–41. 
 260. Id. at 1342, 1343. The Federal Circuit also held that the claim was invalid for lack of 
enablement, but enablement had not been addressed by the district court. Cf. supra note 179. 
 261. Merges, supra note 144, at 1665; see also PTO 112 Guidelines, supra note 122, at 7170–71 
(citing LizardTech for the proposition that the written description requirement looks to the algorithms 
disclosed in the specification to restrict the permissible scope of software claims). 
 262. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text. 
 263. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 264. The Federal Circuit initially issued a series of panel opinions with seemingly contradictory 
holdings. Compare Ultramercial, LLC v. Hulu, LLC, 657 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011), vacated by Wild 
Tangent, Inc. v. Ultramercial, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 2431 (2012) (holding an internet-based business method 
to be patentable subject matter), with Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, 674 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2012) 
(holding an internet-based business method to be unpatentable subject matter). It then took the issue en 
banc and authored a highly fractured opinion. CLS Bank Int‘l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013) (en banc). 
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an algorithm limitation is a sign of a software claim to a particular 
machine and, in turn, a particular machine is one antipode of an abstract 
idea.
265
 If the Federal Circuit pursues this theme, it will be adopting the 
invention-algorithm equation. It will be framing algorithms as the 
metaphorical structures of software inventions in its section 101 analysis 
and using the invention-algorithm equation to invalidate functional claims 
that are not limited to particular structures for achieving claimed functions. 
In other words, the Federal Circuit will be developing its contemporary 
prohibition on claims to abstract ideas in the software arts on the model of 
the Supreme Court‘s nineteenth century prohibition on claims to principles 
in the mechanical arts in cases like Wyeth and O’Reilly: in both situations, 
the courts uphold functional claims only if they are tied to the structural 
properties of a particular machine, whether literal or metaphorical.
266
 
For at least a decade before Bilski, the Federal Circuit had been treating 
the patentable subject matter requirement of section 101 as a mere 
formality in the software arts and using an extremely expansive test for 
patentable subject matter.
267
 The Federal Circuit‘s 2008 opinion in In re 
Bilski represented a significant shift insofar as it adopted a test for 
patentable subject matter with more bite: the machine-or-transformation 
test.
268
 Under the machine-or-transformation test, a method claim 
describes a statutory ―process‖ under section 101 only if the method is 
either tied to a particular machine or responsible for transforming an 
article into a different state or thing.
269
 The Federal Circuit used its newly 
minted test to invalidate claims that could be infringed by human 
execution of a set of legal contracts entirely unaided by machines of any 
 
 
 265. There are several distinct definitions of an abstract idea, so there are several distinct 
antipodes. See Kevin Emerson Collins, Bilski and the Ambiguity of “an Unpatentable Abstract Idea,” 
15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 37 (2011). 
 266. See supra Part II.C.1. Importantly, the requirement that a machine of any kind be used to 
infringe the claims is not a sufficient condition for patentable subject matter. The Wyeth claim was 
clearly tied to machinery, as it claimed the cutting of ice by power other than human power. Similarly, 
the Morse claim presumptively could not be infringed without using a machine of some kind. 
However, neither claim was tied to any particular machine with a specified set of structural properties. 
Similarly, under the invention-algorithm equation, a patentable claim to a programmed computer must 
be tied to a computer that executes a particular algorithm, not simply a computer that accomplishes a 
functionally specified result. 
 267. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(restating the useful, concrete, and tangible results test). 
 268. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 269. Id. at 954. 
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kind (except pencils and sheets of paper, perhaps) and that were therefore 
clearly not tied to a particular machine.
270
  
The Supreme Court affirmed the Federal Circuit‘s holding in Bilski, but 
it used different reasoning to justify its conclusion.
271
 The Court agreed 
with the Federal Circuit in general terms that the section 101 restriction on 
patentable subject matter was more than a formality, but it held that its 
earlier (and difficult to parse) opinions in Gottschalk v. Benson,
272
 Parker 
v. Flook,
273
 and Diamond v. Diehr
274
 provided the ultimate test for 
patentable subject matter. Drawing its rhetoric from these cases, but not 
providing much in the way of a reasoned analysis to explain its 
conclusion, the Court labeled the Bilski claims as impermissible attempts 
to patent an abstract idea.
275
 Importantly, however, the Court did not 
dismiss the machine-or-transformation test as irrelevant to the 
identification of patentable subject matter. Rather, the Court stated that the 
machine-or-transformation test may often serve as a ―useful and important 
clue‖ and ―an investigative tool‖ for determining whether a claim 
impermissibly describes an abstract idea.
276
 
The Bilski claims were not technically software claims. They could be 
infringed either with or without the use of a programmed computer. The 
implications of Bilski for true software claims are therefore only now 
being addressed as a matter of first impression in the Federal Circuit. 
Whether analyzed under the machine-or-transformation test or the 
prohibition on patenting abstract ideas, the Federal Circuit has repeatedly 
rejected the argument that software claims describe particular machines 
merely because they are tied to a general purpose computer that exhibits a 
specified behavior.
277
 Precisely what additional limitations are required to 
transform a computer-executed abstract idea into a patentable computer-
technology invention remains hazy, but algorithm limitations are emerging 
 
 
 270. Id. at 963–64. Nor were the claims responsible for transforming an article into a different 
state or thing. Id. 
 271. 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
 272. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).  
 273. 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
 274. 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
 275. Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3227, 3230.  
 276. Id. at 3225–27.  
 277. See, e.g., CLS Bank Int‘l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc); 
Bancorp Servs. v. Sun Life Assurance Co., 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Dealertrack, Inc. v. 
Huber, 674 F.3d 1315, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fort Props., Inc. v. Am. Master Lease LLC, 671 F.3d 
1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Fuzzysharp Techs. Inc. v. 3DLabs Inc., 447 F. App‘x 182, 185–86 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011). But see infra note 284. 
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as an important indicator of software claims that describe a ―particular 
machine‖ and thus that recite patentable subject matter.278  
For example, in Dealertrack, Inc. v. Huber, the Federal Circuit held 
that a claim to a computer-aided method of selling bonds described an 
abstract idea and thus was not patentable subject matter.
279
 To support its 
conclusion, the court noted that, although the specification disclosed 
several algorithms for achieving the claimed function, the scope of the 
claims themselves was ―construed not to be limited to any particular 
algorithm‖ for selling bonds.280 The negative implication is that the 
Federal Circuit would have looked more favorably on the claim if it had 
recited an algorithm limitation. Similarly, in CyberSource Corp. v. Retail 
Decisions, Inc.,
281
 the Federal Circuit addressed whether a claim to a 
method of fraud detection was patentable subject matter. It invoked the 
fact that the claim did ―not limit its scope to any particular . . . algorithm‖ 
for detecting fraud to bolster its conclusion that the claim described an 
unpatentable abstract idea.
282
 In sum, both Dealertrack and CyberSource 
explicitly consider the invention-algorithm equation when determining if a 
software claim is too broad to be patentable subject matter. 
In other post-Bilski software cases addressing the reach of patentable 
subject matter, the Federal Circuit discusses the substance of the 
invention-algorithm equation without employing the term ―algorithm.‖ For 
example, in Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, the majority opinion 
reasoned that patentable subject matter: 
focuses on whether the claims tie the otherwise abstract idea to a 
specific way of doing something with a computer, or a specific 
computer for doing something; if so, they likely will be patent 
eligible. On the other hand, claims directed to nothing more than the 
 
 
 278. Algorithm limitations can weigh in favor of patentability regardless of the rhetorical 
framework in which the doctrine of patentable subject matter is couched. Talk of particular machines 
derives from the machine-or-transformation test, but algorithms may also demonstrate the absence of 
preemption, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972), the existence of an application of an 
abstract idea, Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, the inclusion of a meaningful limitation on claim scope, CLS 
Bank, 717 F.3d at 1281, 1286, or the presence of enough in addition to an abstract idea to make a 
claim patentable subject matter, Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 
1297 (2012). 
 279. Dealertrack, 647 F.3d 1315. 
 280. Id. at 1334. 
 281. 654 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2011).  
 282. Id. at 1372. 
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idea of doing that thing on a computer are likely to face larger 
problems.
283
 
Substituting ―an algorithm for performing a function‖ for ―a specific way 
of doing something‖ and ―the function itself‖ for ―the idea of doing that 
thing,‖ Ultramercial provides a succinct articulation of the invention-
algorithm equation.
284
 
C. Are Algorithms a Patent Medicine? 
Patent law‘s functionality malfunction has generated the problem of 
software-patent overbreadth,
285
 and a continuation of the Federal Circuit‘s 
uncoordinated, tentative steps toward the adoption of an invention-
algorithm equation offers one potential solution to the problem.
286
 In fact, 
short of a more radical move such as abandoning the peripheral claiming 
regime in the software arts
287
 or categorically excluding software from 
patentable subject matter,
288
 the invention-algorithm equation may 
represent the most promising route forward for incremental, judicial 
reform of software-patent scope.
289
  
However, it is far from clear that algorithms represent a real cure for 
the ills of software patents rather than a patent medicine. The remainder of 
this section addresses three reasons for doubting that the invention-
algorithm equation will put software patents on par with patents in other 
technologies. Part IV.C.1 addresses a threshold concern that could, with 
concerted effort, be overcome: the Federal Circuit must use the invention-
structure equation in a uniform manner, regardless of the style in which 
 
 
 283. No. 2010-1544, 2013 WL 3111404, at *13 (Fed. Cir. June 21, 2013); see also CLS Bank, 717 
F.3d at 1302 (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (employing similar language). 
 284. However, there are also themes within these same post-Bilski software cases that undermine 
the invention-algorithm equation. For example, the Federal Circuit repeatedly cites its twenty-year-old 
opinion in In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.Cir.1994) (en banc), to suggest that any computer 
programmed to implement a new process is a special-purpose computer that is patentable subject 
matter. Ultramercial, 2013 WL 3111404, at *13, *16; CLS Bank, 717 F.3d at 1302 (Rader, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Additionally, the disclosure of algorithms for performing the 
claimed functions in the specification sometimes appears to weigh in favor of patentable subject matter 
even when it is unclear that the algorithms are limitations on claim scope. Ultramercial, 2013 WL 
3111404, at *15. 
 285. See supra Part III.B. 
 286. See supra Parts IV.A & B. 
 287. A central claiming regime would presumptively allow courts to tailor claim scope to an 
inventor‘s contribution on the fly during infringement proceedings. BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 
158, 160; cf. Burk & Lemley, supra note 25 (discussing the merits of a shift to central claiming in all 
arts). 
 288. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 289. Mark Lemley has recently made precisely this argument. Lemley, supra note 1. 
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software claims are drafted or the doctrine through which it is applied. Part 
IV.C.2 examines the deeper and more intractable problem that follows 
from the infinitely recursive definition of an algorithm. Part IV.C.3 notes a 
concern that derives from the Supreme Court‘s identification of algorithms 
in the abstract as unpatentable subject matter in Gottschalk v. Benson.
290
 
1. Uniformity 
If algorithms are to rectify the functionality malfunction in the software 
arts, the invention-algorithm equation must be applied to software claims 
in a consistent, uniform manner. It must limit the scope of functional 
limitations in software claims regardless of the style in which the claims 
are drafted. Today, the Federal Circuit is not close to achieving this goal. 
The lack of consistency exists both within the Federal Circuit‘s rules 
governing means-plus-function limitations and between the three doctrines 
that employ the invention-structure equation. 
In theory, the rules of means-plus-function claiming codified in section 
112(f) should apply whenever a claim recites functional limitations that 
fail to recite a sufficient quantum of the structural properties of the 
technology that an inventor actually produces and discloses. This should 
be a substantive threshold that is directly tied to the Supreme Court‘s 
holding in Halliburton and the prevention of claim overbreadth.
291
 
However, the Federal Circuit has interpreted section 112(f) in a formalistic 
manner, allowing patent applicants to evade its scope-restricting rule of 
claim construction simply by altering the style in which a claim is drafted.  
Initially, it is unclear how—or even if—the scope-restricting rules of 
section 112(f) will govern software claims drafted as method rather than 
apparatus claims. The text of section 112(f) clearly applies to method 
claims. It requires the scope of limitations in method claims reciting a 
―step‖ for accomplishing ―a specified function‖ to be limited to the ―acts 
described in the specification and equivalents thereof.‖292 Yet, by the late 
1990s, the courts had barely even discussed the application of step-plus-
function claiming to method claims.
293
 In a 1999 concurring opinion in 
 
 
 290. 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
 291. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 292. 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) (2012). 
 293. Brad A. Schepers, Note, Interpretation of Patent Process Claims in Light of the Narrowing 
Effect of 35 U.S.C. § 112(6), 31 IND. L. REV. 1133, 1162 (1998) (―It is nothing less than remarkable 
that four and one-half decades have passed without the emergence of judicial guidance concerning 
how (or if) paragraph six applies to process or method claims.‖).  
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Seal-Flex, Inc. v. Athletic Track & Court Construction,
294
 the Federal 
Circuit finally broached the topic, noting generically that a limitation in a 
method claim that recites a ―function‖ without sufficient supporting ―acts‖ 
for performing the function should be limited in scope to the acts disclosed 
in the specification and their equivalents.
295
 To date, the Federal Circuit 
has still never identified a step in a method claim as a step-plus-function 
limitation.
296
 For example, the Federal Circuit would be unlikely to subject 
claim 22 of the ‘670 patent to the scope-narrowing rules of section 112(f), 
despite the fact that it is a purely functional claim.
297
 If the rules of means-
plus-function claiming are to enforce the invention-algorithm equation and 
provide a meaningful limit on the scope of software claims, the Federal 
Circuit must extend them to encompass method claims. Apparatus and 
method claims can always be drawn to the same software invention, and 
there is no persuasive reason to draw a categorical distinction between 
them in terms of permissible claim scope.  
Furthermore, even within the realm of apparatus claims, the Federal 
Circuit‘s formalistic threshold rules for determining whether a functional 
claim limitation is a means-plus-function limitation lead to disparate 
treatment of similar claims. If a claim uses the term ―means for,‖ the 
Federal Circuit employs a presumption that section 112(f) applies that can 
be rebutted if sufficient structural limitations on the means are also 
present.
298
 Inversely, if a claim does not use that term, there is a 
presumption that section 112(f) does not apply that can be rebutted if the 
claim fails to recite sufficient structural limitations.
299
 If these twin 
presumptions could be readily rebutted, the Federal Circuit‘s threshold 
rules for identifying means-plus-function claims would govern most 
functional apparatus claims. However, the Federal Circuit interprets each 
 
 
 294. 172 F.3d 836 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (Rader, J., concurring). 
 295. Id. at 847–51. 
 296. That is, to the best of the author‘s knowledge. Cf. Zimmeck, supra note 15, 180 n.81 
(collecting cases). In part, the problem is simply the Federal Circuit‘s presumptions. The Federal 
Circuit has held that the absence ―step for‖ language creates a presumption against the applicability of 
section 112(f). Seal-Flex, 172 F.3d at 850 (Rader, J., concurring). There is no reason why a patent 
drafter would opt into the scope-restricting rules of 112(f) if he can obtain broader, valid claims by not 
opting in. In part, however, the Federal Circuit‘s reluctance to use section 112(f) to construe method 
claims likely stems from a deeper problem. Method claims are often functional all the way down, and 
employing 112(f) to limit the scope of method claims would raise the intractable problem of infinite 
recursion, just as it does in software apparatus claims. See infra Part IV.C.2.  
 297. See supra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. However, the same claim redrafted as an 
apparatus claim that used the language ―means for‖ would be subject to 112(f).  
 298. TriMed, Inc. v. Stryker Corp., 514 F.3d 1256, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2008).  
 299. Lighting World, Inc. v. Birchwood Lighting, Inc., 382 F.3d 1354, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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of its presumptions as ―a strong one that is not readily overcome.‖300 When 
apparatus claims to software inventions do not use the term ―means for,‖ 
the court often finds sufficient structure in claim limitations to preclude 
the application of section 112(f) even when the claim is in effect a purely 
functional claim.
301
 In fact, the Federal Circuit has recently stated that it is 
up to the patent drafter to signal whether he has elected to invoke the rules 
of means-plus-function claiming, suggesting that patent drafters can opt 
out of the scope-restricting provisions of section 112(f) whenever they 
choose to do so.
302
 As a result, many purely functional software apparatus 
claims are never narrowed under section 112(f). 
The formalistic rules governing means-plus-function claims would not 
matter at the end of the day if the other doctrines that employ the 
invention-algorithm equation were to impose the same restrictions on 
overbroad functional claims that section 112(f) does. That is, if the 
invention-structure equation were to be recognized as a unitary design 
principle of patent law, then the particular doctrine through which the 
scope-restricting mechanism was administered would be irrelevant. Courts 
could use the written description doctrine or the doctrine of patentable 
subject matter to invalidate the overbroad, functional claims that evade the 
scope-constraining rules of means-plus-function claiming. However, the 
Federal Circuit is far from achieving this goal, and, because of the inherent 
difficulties with identifying an algorithm discussed in the following 
section, it is unlikely to achieve this goal anytime in the near future.  
2. Recursion 
Algorithms are recursive entities: algorithms have sub-algorithms, 
which have sub-sub-algorithms, etc. Algorithms have two qualities that 
make them recursive. First, they specify a way of achieving a task that 
consists of listing yet more tasks that need to be achieved. An algorithm 
 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. For example, the term ―programmed logic circuit‖ was held to have sufficient structure to 
prevent the application of 112(f). Apex Inc. v. Raritan Computer, Inc., 325 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(holding that ―circuit‖ denotes sufficient structure); see also LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom 
Electronics, Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (holding that a CPU and a partitioned memory 
system were sufficient structure to place a claim limitation reciting ―a control unit‖ beyond the 
purview of 112(f)). 
 302. Flo Healthcare Solutions, LLC v. Kappos, 697 F.3d 1367, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Across all 
technologies, there is empirical evidence suggesting that patent drafters are trying to opt out of 112(f). 
Dennis Crouch, Means Plus Function Claiming, PATENTLYO (Jan. 14, 2013), http://www.patentlyo 
.com/patent/2013/01/means-plus-function-claiming.html (noting the decline in patent applications 
using ―means for‖ language). 
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specifies a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem or accomplishing 
a task,
303
 but each of the steps of the procedure is in and of itself simply 
the statement of a problem that needs solving or a task that needs 
achieving. Again, software is functional all the way down.
304
 Second, 
algorithms can be formulated at many different levels of abstraction.
305
 
Together, these two qualities make algorithms infinitely recursive. An 
algorithm is a step-by-step procedure for solving a problem, but each step 
of the procedure is a more specific problem in need of solving for which 
an algorithm can be specified. Sub-algorithms with more precise step-by-
step procedures exist for each of the steps of an algorithm.
306
  
The recursive nature of algorithms creates a difficulty for courts 
seeking to frame algorithms as the metaphorical structures of software 
inventions and to curtail permissible claim scope with the invention-
algorithm equation. Regardless of the specificity of the functional 
limitation, it is always possible to demand greater specificity in the form 
of an algorithm for performing that function. Assume a software claim 
with a limitation that recites Function A. Under the invention-algorithm 
equation, the claim must be either invalidated as overbroad or limited to 
one or more algorithms for performing the claimed function. Assume that 
the specification discloses an embodiment of a software program for 
performing Function A that serially performs steps A1, A2, and A3 and that 
those steps are an algorithm for Function A. The invention-algorithm 
equation requires that the claim encompass only software programs that 
use this algorithm (and perhaps is equivalents) to perform Function A. So 
far, the result makes perfect sense. But, what if the claim had originally 
been drafted in a narrower manner to expressly recite steps A1, A2, and A3 
as limitations? When recited as claim limitations, these three steps are 
indistinguishable from three functional limitations that specify problems to 
be solved or tasks to be achieved. Steps A1, A2, and A3 thus must be 
conceptualized as Functions A1, A2, and A3. Under a rote application of 
the invention-structure equation, each of these functional limitations must 
 
 
 303. See supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text. 
 304. See supra Part III.A. 
 305. John Swinson, Copyright or Patent or Both: An Algorithmic Approach to Computer Software 
Protection, 5 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 145, 146–50 (1991). Copyright law assumes that algorithms 
describe software programs at one particular level of abstraction. Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. 
Indus., 9 F.3d 823, 834–35 (10th Cir. 1993). Whether or not this is a reasonable assumption in 
copyright law, it is clearly an oversimplification in patent law. 
 306. Swinson, supra note 305, at 148 (―There is a continuum between the high-level description 
of the solution to the problem and the low-level machine code. The only change is the detail of 
expression.‖).  
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be limited in scope to a particular algorithm—perhaps the algorithms 
consisting of the steps A1a, A1b, and A1c; A2a, A2b, and A2c; and A3a, A3b, 
and A3c (assuming each step of the original algorithm is performed 
through a three-step sub-algorithm). This result is odd, as it makes the 
permissible scope of a patent contingent on the form in which the claim is 
drafted. An overbroad initial claim gets transformed into a permissible, 
narrower claim, but an initial claim that is identical in scope to the 
permissible, narrower claim is overbroad. 
And, of course, the problem does not end here. The recursion is 
infinite. If an inventor were to recite any of the steps of a sub-algorithm as 
steps in a claim, they, too, would be purely functional claim limitations, 
and they, too, would have to be limited to particular algorithms. 
Embracing algorithms as metaphorical structure in a rote fashion leads 
down the rabbit hole. It creates a patent regime that makes the permissible 
breadth of a claim depend entirely upon the level of specificity at which 
claim limitations are initially drawn and that bizarrely penalizes patent 
applicants who initially file claims that are more modest in scope. 
In most arts, the invention-structure equation does not lead to infinite 
regress.
307
 A technology‘s structural properties are not its functional 
properties at a lower level of generality. Rather, structural properties are 
categorically distinct from functional properties.
308
 Furthermore, the 
distinction is, in most cases at least, an intuitive one that judges and 
examiners can readily grasp: what things are as a matter of structure is 
distinct from what things do as a matter of their function. However, the 
translation of the invention-structure equation into the invention-algorithm 
equation erases the intuitive distinction. There is no inherent difference 
between a ―goal‖ and a step in an algorithm for achieving that goal or a 
―function‖ and a step in the process for implementing that function.309 It is 
all a matter of context. A goal becomes a step in an implementation 
process simply by juxtaposing it with a more general goal, and a step in an 
implementation process becomes a functional goal by bracketing the more 
general function and removing it from consideration.
310
 
 
 
 307. But see supra note 296 (noting the recursion problem in step-plus-function method claims). 
 308. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 309. But see Lemley, supra note 1, at 3, 39 (articulating these distinctions and relying on them 
when formulating a proposal to use algorithms to curtail the scope of functional claims). 
 310. In a submission to the PTO on how to apply section 112(f) to functional software claims, 
Google argues that the PHOSITA can distinguish a functional description of software that describes an 
algorithm from one that does not. Google thereby implies that there is no problem of infinite recursion. 
Comments of Google Inc., supra note 244, at *14–*21. However, the submission does not attempt to 
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To avoid the software-specific problem of infinite regress, the Federal 
Circuit cannot employ the invention-algorithm equation in a rote manner 
as it does today. It cannot limit all functional limitations in software claims 
to algorithms for performing those functions. It needs to identify a bottom 
as a matter of policy—a level of generality below which a functional 
property of a software program counts as metaphorical structure, 
regardless of whether the property is recited as a limitation in a claim or as 
a step of an algorithm disclosed in a patent specification that is read into a 
claim through 112(f). This undertaking would initially require consultation 
with computer scientists to create a taxonomy of a variety of levels of 
abstraction at which the functional properties of a software program can be 
formulated.
311
 Then, as a determination that is endogenous to patent policy 
and the economics of sufficient incentives, the courts would have to 
identify the level of abstraction at which algorithmic descriptions of 
software become sufficiently specific to count as the descriptions of the 
metaphorical structure of software inventions. That is, courts would have 
to determine the level of specificity at which the functions performed by a 
software program constitute an answer to the ―how‖ question that provides 
sufficient rewards to inventors without over-rewarding them.
312
 In so 
doing, courts would need to draw the very line on the spectrum between 
the general functions that are likely to map onto markets (e.g., end-user 
preferences) and the specific functions that are not (e.g., how-functions) 
that, to date, they have avoided drawing in the non-software arts.
313
 
Whether either of these undertakings, and the second one in particular, 
lies within the institutional competence of an Article III court such as the 
Federal Circuit is an open question, at best. To obtain the technical and 
economic data that is needed to fix the definition of an algorithm at the 
optimal level of specificity, courts must rely on the self-interested 
disclosures of patentees, alleged infringers, and amici, all made in the 
course of arguing whether an individual patent is broad or narrow, valid or 
invalid.
314
 It may be that algorithms offer the best hope for fixing patent 
 
 
provide criteria for distinguishing a functional goal (overbroad) from a functional step of an algorithm 
(not overbroad). 
 311. See, e.g., David C. Bohrer & Michael I. Frankel, The Question Left Unanswered in WMS 
Gaming: What Is the Algorithm?, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Apr. 2004, at 8 (arguing that Unified 
Modeling Language could provide a standard method for describing algorithms). 
 312. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.  
 313. See supra notes 80–90 and accompanying text.  
 314. Dan Burk and Mark Lemley argue that the courts are the best institution through which to 
achieve industry-specific patent reform precisely because ―[t]he [adversarial] litigation process will 
provide judges with the information they need to decide cases‖ in an industry-specific manner. BURK 
& LEMLEY, supra note 1, at 104.  
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law‘s functionality malfunction in the software arts, but it may also be that 
the courts lack the institutional competence to do the needed work. If the 
invention-algorithm equation is to be a software-specific patch for the 
functionality malfunction, other institutions that can more readily collect 
and weigh the needed data may need to take the lead.  
3. Gottschalk v. Benson 
In Gottschalk v. Benson,
315
 the Supreme Court invalidated a patent on a 
software-executed method of converting numbers from one form of 
notation to another, holding that the patent did not recite patentable subject 
matter under section 101 of the Patent Act. The Court couched its 
reasoning in terms of algorithms. It identified mathematical algorithms as 
some of ―the basic tools of scientific and technological work,‖ and it held 
that mathematical algorithms per se are unpatentable abstract ideas.
316
  
Broadly speaking, Benson established a script for assessing whether or 
not a software claim describes patentable subject matter. It has ensured 
that courts view algorithm limitations in software claims as red flags that 
warn of potential invalidity issues. Because any software patent that 
implicates something that looks like an algorithm must be subject to 
additional scrutiny to determine if it is a claim to an algorithm per se, 
software patents implicating algorithms are viewed as relatively more 
problematic than other software claims from a social-welfare perspective 
and relatively less likely to be upheld as valid in the courts.
317
 The 
Supreme Court‘s final two cases in its software trilogy of the 1970s and 
early 1980s came to different bottom-line conclusions concerning the 
validity of algorithm patents, with Parker v. Flook invalidating a patent
318
 
and Diamond v. Diehr upholding one.
319
 But, importantly, they both 
adhered to Benson‘s script. A long line of cases in the lower courts both 
before and after Diehr was also centered on the hunt for impermissible 
 
 
 315. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).  
 316. Id. at 67. The terminology used to describe algorithms in opinions addressing patentable 
subject matter is inconsistent. Benson refers to algorithms as ―ideas.‖ Id. at 71. Later Supreme Court 
opinions modify the terminology to ―abstract ideas,‖ see, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 
309 (1980), and contemporary Federal Circuit opinions describe Benson‘s holding as an example of 
the abstract-ideas exclusion. CLS Bank Int‘l v. Alice Corp. Pty., 717 F.3d 1269, 1277–78 (Fed. Cir. 
2013) (en banc). Yet, some post-Benson Supreme Court cases refer to mathematical algorithms as 
―laws of nature.‖ See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185–86 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 
584, 590 (1978). 
 317. Until recently, the Patent and Trademark Office still followed this script. See Examination 
Guidelines for Computer-Related Inventions, 61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7489 n.50 (Feb. 28, 1996).  
 318. Flook, 437 U.S. at 588–96. 
 319. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–93. 
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claims to algorithms per se.
320
 The screening that Benson mandates to 
identify the subset of algorithm patents that does not describe patentable 
subject matter means that the validity of all patents reciting algorithms has 
been viewed with a greater amount of skepticism. Patent drafters have thus 
avoided reciting algorithm limitations whenever possible.
321
 
For the last forty years—an era that encompasses the birth and 
maturation of the modern software industry—Benson has anchored the 
conventional wisdom on algorithms in the law of software patents.
322
 The 
use of algorithms as the metaphorical structure of software inventions, 
however, will require turning Benson on its head while, at the same time, 
upholding it. Where Benson suggests that software claims reciting 
algorithms are more likely to be problematic, the invention-algorithm 
equation suggests that software claims reciting algorithms are less likely to 
be problematic. Where Benson holds that claims to algorithms are 
unpatentable claims to abstract ideas, the invention-algorithm equation 
holds that functional software claims that do not recite algorithm 
limitations are unpatentable claims to abstract ideas.  
The combination of Benson and the invention-structure equation puts 
the drafters of software patents in a difficult bind. In most arts, claims that 
simply recite the structural properties of invention are routinely upheld. 
They represent a clear way of working around the prohibition on 
functional claims. A claim that describes a chemical compound by its full 
molecular structure, or a claim to a mousetrap that recites only its 
arrangement of parts, is unlikely either to be an unpatentable basic tool 
 
 
 320. For an extensive examination of Benson‘s legacy in software cases through 1990, see Pamela 
Samuelson, Benson Revisited: The Case Against Patent Protection for Algorithms and Other 
Computer Program-Related Inventions, 39 EMORY L.J. 1025, 1032–1113 (1990). 
 321. Robin Feldman draws a direct connection between Benson and the broad, functional claims 
of contemporary software parts. Software inventors opted not to include any algorithmic specificity in 
their claims, and thus sought sweepingly broad functional claims, precisely to avoid having their 
claims red-flagged under Benson. ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 109–12 (2012). 
 322. For a small sampling of commentary that examines algorithm patents through the lens 
established in Benson, see Donald S. Chisum, The Patentability of Algorithms, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 959 
(1986); Irah H. Donner & J. Randall Beckers, Throwing Out Baby Benson with the Bath Water: 
Proposing a New Test for Determining Statutory Subject Matter, 33 JURIMETRICS J. 247 (1993); 
Jonathan N. Geld, General Does Not Mean Generic—Shedding Light on In re Alappat, 4 TEX. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 71 (1995); Lee A. Hollaar, Justice Douglas Was Right: The Need For Congressional Action 
On Software Patents, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 283 (1996); Newell, supra note 212; Samuelson, supra note 320; 
Richard H. Stern, Tales from the Algorithm War: Benson to Iwahashi, It's Deja Vu All Over Again, 18 
AIPLA Q.J. 371 (1991); Jur Strobos, Stalking the Elusive Patentable Software: Are There Still Diehr 
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claim or to be invalidated for overbreadth. In the software arts, however, 
Benson means that the analogs of raw structural claims—namely raw 
algorithm claims—are basic tool claims that are not patentable subject 
matter. Yet, a patent attorney who recites the metaphorical structure of a 
software invention in the abstract and claims an algorithm per se will have 
his claim invalidated under Benson. In software—and only software—
claim drafters must walk a fine line between insufficient and excessive 
―structural‖ limitations.  
Benson and the invention-algorithm equation are clearly in tension, yet 
there are perhaps ways to manage this tension and create a workable set of 
validity rules for software patents. For example, perhaps there is a large 
Goldilocks zone. If Benson and the invention-algorithm equation were 
only to eliminate a small number of claims at each extreme, then there 
could be ample space in the middle for patent drafters to include algorithm 
limitations without claiming algorithms in the abstract.
323
 Alternatively, 
perhaps Benson only pertains to a particular type of algorithm. For 
example, there is clearly textual support for limiting Benson to the realm 
of the mathematical algorithm. Benson describes its own holding as a bar 
on claims to a mathematical formula,
324
 and the Court later reaffirmed in 
Flook that Benson was aimed only at mathematical algorithms.
325
 Yet, the 
Court has more recently extended the logic of Benson and Flook to the 
abstract idea of ―the basic concept of hedging,‖ complicating a narrow, 
mathematical interpretation of Benson.
326
 In any case, managing the 
tension between Benson and the invention-algorithm equation will require 
a reconsideration and clarification of Benson that, to date, the courts have 
been reluctant to undertake.  
In conclusion, consider one recent example of the conflict between 
Benson and the invention-algorithm equation. Bilski v. Kappos is best 
known for the Supreme Court‘s decision to hold a broad claim to a method 
 
 
 323. It is not self-evident, however, that a Goldilocks zone exists. Under the computer-science 
definition of an algorithm, see supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text, most all method claims 
describe algorithms in the abstract. Most all method claims describe a step-by-step procedure for 
achieving a result of some kind. A more precise definition of the type of algorithm that cannot be 
claimed in the abstract under Benson may therefore be needed to create a Goldilocks zone. 
 324. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972). 
 325. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585–86 (1978). The basic-tools rationale of Benson also has 
an intuitive fit with mathematical principles in particular. 
 326. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010). Additionally, the Federal Circuit has been 
less than clear in its position on what constitutes a mathematical algorithm under Benson. Compare In 
re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1989), with In re Trovato, 42 F.3d 1376, 1378–80 (Fed. 
Cir. 1994). Furthermore, the distinction between mathematical and non-mathematical algorithms is 
conceptually problematic, so the distinction may not prove to be an effective limiting principle for 
Benson. Newell, supra note 212, at 1204; Samuelson, supra note 320, at 1123–24. 
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of hedging a certain type of risk in commodities markets to be an 
unpatentable claim to an abstract idea.
327
 However, Bilski also addressed 
the patentability of a narrower, dependent claim in which a mathematical 
formula specified how the fixed price for the hedged transaction was to be 
determined.
328
 Under the invention-algorithm equation, the case for the 
patentability of the narrow, dependent claim under section 101 should 
have been stronger than the case for the patentability of the broad, 
independent claim. The addition of the specific way of performing the 
hedging as a limitation on claim scope should have weighed in favor of 
patentability. Yet, the Supreme Court saw no daylight at all between the 
two claims. The Court stated that the dependent claim simply ―reduced‖ 
the concept of hedging ―to a mathematical formula‖ and was therefore 
unpatentable subject matter under Benson and Flook.
329
 The mathematical 
nature of the algorithm led to the Court to pay no attention whatsoever to a 
scope-restricting, algorithmic limitation on a broad, functional claim. 
Benson trumped the invention-algorithm equation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The root cause of the problem of software-patent overbreadth is patent 
law‘s functionality malfunction. The invention-structure equation is patent 
law‘s traditional doctrinal mechanism for curtailing the scope of functional 
claims, and it breaks down when it is brought to bear on technologies that, 
like software, are functional on all relevant levels of definition. Patent 
law‘s conventional scope-curtailing doctrines therefore have not been able 
to get the traction in the software arts that they get in most other arts, and 
purely functional, overbroad software claims have become the norm. 
Courts can attempt to fix the functionality malfunction in the software 
arts by translating the invention-structure equation into an invention-
algorithm equation. They can identify algorithms as the metaphorical 
structure of software inventions and limit the scope of software claims to 
the particular algorithms produced and disclosed by an inventor. In fact, 
the Federal Circuit has already begun to use the invention-algorithm 
equation to curtail the scope of software claims, albeit in a halting, 
uncoordinated, and inconsistent way. However, the recursive nature of an 
algorithm and Gottschalk v. Benson, among other problems, mean that 
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even a more sustained focus on algorithms is unlikely to put the scope of 
software patents on par with the scope of patents in other arts.  
This Article cannot speak directly to the best route forward for dealing 
with software patents. Perhaps the costs of the overbreadth of 
contemporary software patents are the minimum price that needs to be 
paid for sufficient incentives. Alternatively, perhaps these costs are so 
significant and difficult to eliminate that the best route forward is to 
exclude software from patentable subject matter. Or, perhaps they can be 
reduced dramatically through the adoption of a technology-specific rule 
such as the invention-algorithm equation. This Article argues only that the 
minimization of the costs of software-patent overbreadth is going to be 
more difficult than has previously been recognized. The functionality 
malfunction is a structural problem (in more than one sense). The open 
question is not whether software as a technology is intrinsically different 
in a way that increases the costs of software patents relative to patents in 
other technologies. The open question is rather how large those software-
specific costs must be. 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
